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Georges Bank-Common Ground or
Continued Battleground?
COMPARATIVE MARINE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA
DONNA R. CHRISTIE*
The controversies between the United States and Canada concern-
ing boundaries, fish, and transboundary environmental effects of
energy development are only the most recent in two centuries of
conflicts in the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank region. Current envi-
ronmental problems, however, seem to be straining the normally
congenial relations between the two countries. As an initial step in
assessing management options for the area, this Article presents a
comparative analysis of environmental assessment and the marinefisheries management and outer continental shelf development re-
gimes of the United States and Canada. Finally, prospects for thefuture of cooperative management attempts and initial recommen-
dations are addressed.
INTRODUCTION
The Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank region is an area of great eco-
nomic importance for both the United States and Canadian fishing
industries and may be the site of major oil and gas reserves.' In 1977
the problems of competitive fishing and conflicting continental shelf
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University; B.S. 1969, University of
Georgia; J.D. 1978, University of Georgia; Marine Policy Fellow 1978-1980, Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution. The author wishes to thank the Florida State University
College of Law for sponsoring research leave to complete this Article.
1. See generally Swan, That Gulf of Maine Dispute: Canada and the United
States Delimit the Atlantic Continental Shelf, 10 NAT. RESOURCES L. 405, 406-16
(1977).
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claims in the region2 were exacerbated by the extension of overlap-
ping 200-mile fishing zones by both countries.3 After negotiations to
delineate a boundary failed, the dispute was submitted to a Special
Chamber of the International Court of Justice4 (ICJ). The Special
Chamber was asked to establish a single maritime boundary to serve
as both a continental shelf boundary for oil development and as a
water column boundary for fisheries management." Attorneys, schol-
ars, and scientists from both the United States and Canada spent
several years compiling evidence and developing arguments concern-
ing the location of the offshore boundary between the two countries
in the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank region. Every aspect of the
area's geographic, geological, geomorphological, zoological, and eco-
nomic history was intensively studied. On October 12, 1984, the Spe-
cial Chamber of the ICJ reported its decision on the boundary line,e
but the resource management problems that precipitated the dispute
persist.
Drawing a line on the water is but a starting point in resolving the
conflicts that have arisen in the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank area.
An established jurisdictional line between the two countries ad-
dresses only the fundamental question of sovereignty over certain
ocean areas. A boundary line does not and cannot address the most
important issues: 1) management of transboundary resources; and 2)
transboundary effects of resource development. Arguably, trans-
boundary resources, such as fisheries or frontier oil reserves, can be
most efficiently exploited or conserved through joint management.
Unfortunately, no mechanisms for joint management currently ex-
2. Canada first issued permits for oil exploration on Georges Bank in 1964. The
claim to jurisdiction was based on an equidistance boundary delimitation through the
Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank. The United States did not formally protest the issu-
ance of permits or the boundary claim until late 1969. In 1970, the two countries began
negotiations on delimitation of a continental shelf boundary, but no progress had been
made by the time the 200 mile fishery jurisdiction extensions were imminent. See gener-
ally Swan, supra note 1; Feldman & Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the United
States, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 729, 754-63 (1981); CANADIAN DEP'T OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
PRESS RELEASE. CANADA'S VIEW OF THE GULF OF MAINE/GEORGES BANK BOUNDARY
LINE (June 10, 1977) [hereinafter cited as CANADIAN PRESS RELEASE].
3. See Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MFCMA]; Fishing Zones of Canada
(Zones 4 and 5) Order, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 1548 (1978).
4. See Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, March 29, 1979, United States-Canada,
T.I.A.S. No. 10204 [hereinafter cited as Boundary Treaty]. See generally McRae, Adju-
dication of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, 1979 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 292;
Note, International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and the Gulf of Maine Dis-
pute, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 463 (1983).
5. Boundary Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2.
6. Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Gulf of Maine].
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ist.7 In areas of semi-enclosed seas such as the Gulf of Maine and
Canada's Bay of Fundy, even clearly local ocean and coastal man-
agement decisions can have transnational environmental and eco-
nomic effects that should be considered. A study of the options for
management in the area is needed.
The Gulf of Maine delimitation case may have compounded man-
agement problems by placing the two countries in an adversarial po-
sition. On the other hand, a by-product of the case, the compilation
of scientific and economic data for the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank
area, is of great potential value for management in the future. Sel-
dom have managers or negotiators had access to such an exhaustive
data base to guide decisionmaking. This unusual opportunity should
not be lost.
A first step toward a reasoned management approach for the area
must include a comparative legal analysis of each country's current
resource management regime to determine the possible mechanisms
for, or impediments to, future management schemes. This Article ex-
amines the United States and Canadian legal frameworks for marine
resource management in the area of the Bay of Fundy, Gulf of
Maine, and Georges Bank. The analysis focuses on fisheries manage-
ment, outer continental shelf (OCS) development, and environmen-
tal assessment.
BACKGROUND
Since the end of the American Revolution, marine boundaries in the
northeast have been a source of contention between the United
States and Canada.8 For example, issues involving navigational
channels, fishing rights, and ownership of islands have triggered
much controversy.
The first boundary resolution in the area was negotiated by Great
Britain and the United states in 1783.9 The Paris Peace Treaty of
7. The United States and Canada originally negotiated a treaty for joint fisher-
ies management as well as a treaty to submit the boundary determination to third party
settlement. The fisheries agreement drew protest from New England fishermen and con-
gressmen, and was eventually withdrawn from the Senate by President Reagan in March
198 1. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text; Feldman & Colson, supra note 2, at
760-61; Emanuelli, La Delimitation des Espaces Maritimes entre le Canada et les
Etats-Unis dans le Golfe du Maine, 28 McGILL L.J. 335, 349-52 (1983).
8. See generally Comment, The United States and Canada in Passamaquoddy
Bay: Internal Waters and the Right of Passage to a Foreign Port. 4 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 167, 171-75 (1976).
9. Id. at 171.
178310 gave to the United States all islands in Passamaquoddy Bay
within twenty leagues of the coast, except for those islands histori-
cally belonging to Nova Scotia.11 Because the islands that belonged
to Nova Scotia were not identified, controversy continued over the
precise location of the boundary. The United States and Great Brit-
ain concluded the War of 1812 by signing the Treaty of Ghent. 2
This treaty provided for two commissioners, one appointed by each
party, to determine the ownership of islands, and therefore the
boundary in Passamaquoddy Bay.1" Only the three westernmost is-
lands-Moose Island, Dudley Island, and Fredrick Island-were
found to belong to the United States; the other disputed islands were
found to be historically a part of the province of Nova Scotia.14
The Passamaquoddy Bay boundary was more precisely defined,
and a major portion of the territorial sea boundary between the
United States and Canada established, by treaties in 1908,15 1910,16
and 1925.17 As a result of these treaties, the Passamaquoddy Bay
boundary line currently runs through the middle of Grand Manan
Channel, terminating approximately seven miles northwest of the
Canadian island of Grand Manan.1 8 The ownership of two small is-
lands located outside of Passamaquoddy Bay and south of Grand
Manan Island-Machias Seal Island and North Rock-is still
disputed. 19
The fact that the United States and Canada each claim a different
breadth of territorial sea can only add to the confusion surrounding
jurisdiction and boundaries. The United States claims a three-mile
territorial sea.20 In 1970, Canada extended its territorial sea bound-
ary from three to twelve miles.2' Although international law does not
10. Treaty of Paris, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great Britian, 8 Stat. 80, T.S.
No. 2.
11. Id. art. 2.
12. Treaty of Ghent, Dec. 24, 1814, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 218,
T.S. No. 109.
13. Id. art. 4.
14. See 1 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY, 61-62 (1898); 1 MALLOY, TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCALS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN AND OTHER POWERS 1776-1909 (1910). See generally
Comment, supra note 8, at 172-74.
15. Treaty Concerning the Canadian International Boundary, Apr. 11, 1908,
United States-Great Britain, 35 Stat. 2003, T.S. No. 497.
16. Treaty concerning the Boundary Line in Passamaquoddy Bay, May 21, 1910,
United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2477, T.S. No. 551.
17. Treaty in Respect of the Boundary between the United States and Canada,
Feb. 24, 1925, United States-Canada, 44 Stat. 2102, T.S. No. 720.
18. See Emanuelli, supra note 7, at 342 n.37.
19. See generally id. at 342-48.
20. Feldman & Colson, supra note 2, at 730.
21. An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea Fishing Zones Act, CAN. REV. STAT. 1st
Supp. ch. 45 (1970).
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mandate any specific breadth of territorial sea, both country's claims
are clearly within the bounds of international custom. The 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone22 sets no
specific limit on the width of the territorial sea, but a twelve-mile
maximum can be inferred from the fact that the combined territorial
sea and contiguous zone can extend no further than twelve miles
from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured." The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea24 recognizes the
right to claim a twelve mile territorial sea.25 As for customary prac-
tice, a majority of coastal nations claim a twelve-mile territorial
sea.26 Recognition of the validity of each country's claim, however,
contributes very little to the resolution of the geographic and equita-
ble problems caused by adjacent or abutting territorial seas of differ-
ent widths.
More recent problems concerning the use for the territorial sea
and nearshore areas are considerably more complicated than issues
of boundary lines and ownership. Two examples are the Head Har-
bor Passage controversy and Canada's Fundy Tidal Power Project. A
proposed oil refinery in Eastport, Maine, near the Canadian bound-
ary, precipitated the Head Harbor Passage controversy. 27 Access to
the Eastport facility would have required oil tankers to pass through
Head Harbor Passage, an area Canada claimed to be her internal
waters. Due to navigation hazards and the environmental sensitivity
of the area, as well as the local importance of fishing and tourism,
Canada banned the passage of large oil tankers through the pas-
sage. Subsequently, the proposal for the Eastport refinery was
abandoned because of problems unrelated to the issue of transna-
tional environmental effects.2
22. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. The United States and
Canada are parties to this convention.
23. Id. art. 24.
24. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited LOS Con-
vention]. Canada has signed this treaty, but the United States has not. Gamble, Assess-
ing the Reality of the Deep Seabed Regime, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 789 (1985).
25. See LOS Convention, supra note 24, art. 3.
26. See Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect, 20
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 561, 591-92 (1983). 77 of 135 coastal nations claimed a 12-mile
territorial sea in 1983. Other claims vary from three to 200 nautical miles.
27. See J. CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 61-72 (1983); Comment,
supra note 8, at 169.
28. See Carroll, supra note 27, at 71-72; Comment, supra note 8, at 168-69.
29. See A. Spiller & J. Roanowicz, The Proposed Pittston Oil Refinery: A Case
The Fundy Tidal Power Project involves a Canadian proposal to
harness the tidal energy in the Bay of Fundy through a hydroelectric
project in a northern basin of the bay. The project would involve the
containment of tremendous amounts of water, possibly resulting in
such effects as a six inch increase in tidal amplitude in New Eng-
land, shoreline erosion, disruption of wetland habitats, and altered
currents in the Gulf of Maine.30
Conflicting claims to offshore areas are of more recent origin than
the territorial sea disputes. These conflicts date from the Truman
Proclamation of 194531 in which the United States unilaterally as-
serted jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf "contiguous
to the coasts of the United States. '3 2 The Truman Proclamation set
no exact bounds for the limits of the claimed jurisdiction, but an
accompanying press release expressed the United States view that
the continental shelf extended to the one hundred fathom depth
line.33 The proclamation provided that overlapping continental shelf
claims should be resolved through the application of equitable
principles.3 4
The one hundred fathom depth line first claimed by the Untied
States to be the limit of its continental shelf would include all of
Georges Bank. It was Canada, however, rather than the United
States, that made the first overt claim to jurisdiction over Georges
Bank in 1964, by issuing geological exploration permits for areas of
Georges Bank n6rth of a line equidistant from Nova Scotia and
Cape Cod.35 The United States3 6 (but not Canada)37 was then a
party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.38 Canada's
Study of U.S. Environmental Decision Making, Working Paper No. 1, at 2 (1984) (to be
published in ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING IN A TRANSBOUNDARY REGION:
FUNDY TIDAL POWER AND THE NEW ENGLAND COAST (A. Rieser & J. Spillers eds.)).
30. See McDorman, Saunders & VanderZwaag, The Gulf of Maine Boundary:
Dropping Anchor or Setting a Course?, 9 MARINE POL'Y 90 (1985).
31. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Truman
Proclamation].
32. Id.
33. 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. 484-85 (1945).
34. See Truman Proclamation, supra note 31.
35. See generally Cuyvers, Maritime Boundaries: Canada v. United States, 2
MARINE POL'Y REP. 1 (1979); CANADIAN PRESS RELEASE, supra note 2; Gulf of Maine,
1984 I.C.J. at 279, para. 61.
36. The United States ratified the Continental Shelf Convention in 1961 and be-
came a party when the treaty entered into force in 1964. See M. BOWMAN & D. HARRIS,
MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 228-29 (1984).
37. Canada did not become a party to the Continental Shelf Convention until
1970. Id. In ratifying the Convention, Canada appended an interpretative declaration to
the effect that it did not recognize accidental features such as channels or depressions as
interrupting the natural prolongation of its land territory. See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J.
at 281, para. 65.
38. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf
Convention].
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reliance on the equidistant line was drawn, however, from article 6
of the Convention, which provides that the boundary of the continen-
tal shelf shall be determined by an equidistance or median line un-
less special circumstances exist.39
The United States did not formally object to the Canadian claim
to Georges Bank until 1969, following the decision of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.40
The ICJ decision rejected the equidistance principle as a rule of law
and emphasized the concept of natural prolongation." Canada was
notified by diplomatic note of the United States refusal to acquiesce
to Canadian claims and exploitation of Georges Bank on November
5, 1969, and by public notice on February 21, 1970.42
Although negotiations to delimit the continental shelf began al-
most immediately in 1970,13 little had been accomplished by 1976
when the dispute was exacerbated by the imminent extension of 200
mile exclusive fisheries zones (FZs) by the two countries. In April
1976, the United States Congress enacted the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act 44 which extended the United States 200-mile
FZ effective March 1, 1977.45 On June 4, 1976, the Canadian For-
eign Secretary announced that Canada would extend jurisdiction
39. Id art. 6. The Continental Shelf Convention states that:
1) Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or
more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the conti-
nental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement be-
tween them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point
of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured.
2) Where the continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent
States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line
is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by ap-
plication of the principle of equidistance from the nearest point of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
40. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
41. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) stated that although equidistance was a convenient method of delimitation, it was
not a rule of law in a case where the Continental Shelf Convention was not applicable.
1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 para. 69, 46 para. 81; see also Emanuelli, supra note 7, at 349.
42. See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 280-81, paras. 64-65. For a complete dis-
cussion of the exchanges between the two governments during this period, see Gulf of
Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 278-81, paras. 60-65.
43. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 2, at 755.
44. MFCMA, supra note 3, §§ 1801-1882.
45. Id. § 1812.
over a 200-mile FZ effective January 1, 1977.46 On November 1,
1976, Canada published the claimed limits of its FZ based on an
equidistance line. 47 The United States responded by publishing its
claimed line, which followed the Northeast Channel.48 In September
1978, following the Anglo-French Arbitration,49 which emphasized
the inequitable effects of islands and promontories on an equidis-
tance boundary, 0 Canada revised its FZ limits to an "equitable
equidistance" line which disregarded Nantucket and Cape Cod but
included more of Georges Bank in the Canadian claim. 1
[SEE FIGURE ON NEXT PAGE]
46. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1976, at 5, col. 5. It was not necessary for the Canadian
government to enact special legislation to extend the fisheries zone, because the 1970 act
creating the 100 mile Artic Antipollution Zone also authorized the extension of exclusive
fisheries zones beyond twelve miles. See An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fish-
ing Zone Act, CAN. REV. STAT. 1st Supp. ch. 45 (1970).
47. See Order in Council P.C., 110 Ca. Gaz., Extra No. 101 (Nov. 1, 1976).
48. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 506, MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 48,619 (1976). In its Me-
morial filed with the ICJ on September 27, 1982, the United States revised its claim to a
"modified perpendicular" that reflected the direction of the coastal front, was perpendic-
ular to the coast, took account of the natural ecological divisions of the area, and main-
tained Canadian jurisdiction over Brown's Bank and German Bank. See infra Figure, p.
499.
49. Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 3, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979).
50. Id. paras. 248-55; see also Colson, The United Kingdom - France Continental
Shelf Arbitration, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 109 (1978); Brown, The Anglo-French Conti-
nental Shelf Case, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 461, 509-10 (1979).
51. See 112 Can. Gaz., Extra No. 79, pt. I (Sept. 15, 1978).
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From December 1975 through July 1976, the boundary negotia-
tions were renewed and expanded with the intent of establishing a
single maritime boundary for both the seabed (the continental shelf)
and the water column (the fishery zones). 52 Boundary negotiations
continued to be fruitless, but the more immediate problem of how to
deal with conflicting fisheries jurisdictions, pending resolution of the
boundary, was temporarily resolved. An interim resolution, the Re-
ciprocal Fisheries Agreement,53 was signed on February 24, 1977.
The purpose of the agreement was to preserve the status quo in the
disputed area and allow each country's fishermen access to the other
country's undisputed FZ based on traditional fishing patterns.54 The
agreement expired, however, on December 31, 1977.55 On June 2,
1978, Canada unilaterally suspended provisional implementation of a
new agreement56 based on the assertion that the United States had
not maintained existing fishing patterns and was not enforcing the
agreement. 57 Each country's fishermen were subsequently banned
from the other's undisputed fisheries zone. This resulted in the con-
tinued competitive overfishing of the disputed areas of Georges Bank
and the Gulf of Maine.
In August 1977, the United States and Canada appointed special
negotiators to recommend "the principles of a comprehensive settle-
ment."58 The new negotiations were to include: "Maritime bounda-
ries delimitation; [c]omplementary fishery and hydrocarbon resource
arrangements, as appropriate; and [s]uch other related matters as
the two governments may decide." 59
The negotiators issued an initial report in 1977 recommending a
plan for cooperative management of fish stocks and a proposal for
dealing with hydrocarbon resources in the boundary area. 0 The ne-
gotiations continued through 1978, and in March 1979 the United
States and Canada signed two treaties: one an agreement on joint
management and conservation of fisheries resources,61 and the other
a treaty to submit the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank boundary dis-
pute to binding arbitration.62 The two treaties were specifically
linked so that one could not enter into force unless the other did. 3
52. See Emanuelli, supra note 7, at 350.
53. Reciprocal Agreement on Fisheries, Feb. 24, 1977, United States-Canada, 28
U.S.T. 5571, T.I.A.S. No. 8648.
54. See Cuyvers, supra note 35, at 2.
55. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 2, at 741.
56. 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. 38 (1978).
57. See id.
58. 77 DEP'T ST. BULL 282 (1977). The United States was represented by Lloyd
N. Cutler, a Washington attorney, while Canada chose Marcel Cadieux, a senior Cana-
dian diplomat.
59. Id.
60. 77 DEP'T ST. BULL 896-97 (1977).
61. Agreement on East Coast Fisheries, March 29, 1979, United States-Canada,
T.I.A.S. No. 9855, reprinted in 9 M. NORDQUIST & K. SIMMONS, NEw DIRECTIONS IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA 178 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fisheries Agreement].
62. See Boundary Treaty, supra note 4.
63. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 2, at 760.
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The fisheries agreement called for the creation of a joint East
Coast Fisheries Commission composed of seven members and co-
chairmen from each country.6 4 The Commission would have regu-
lated fisheries in the area based on principles modeled after the stan-
dards of the United States Fishery Conservation -and Management
Act, 5 and according to percentage allocations of allowable catch es-
tablished by the agreement. 66 The detailed regulatory structure di-
vided fish stocks into three categories: stocks to be jointly managed
by both countries, stocks to be managed primarily by one country,
and stocks to be managed exclusively by one country.6 7 The agree-
ment was intended to establish a permanent mechanism for United
States-Canadian fisheries relations on the east coast.
The fisheries agreement met immediate and strong opposition
from New England fishermen and senators.6 8 The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee delayed a decision on the ratification of the
treaties for two years, and in March 1981 President Reagan with-
drew the fisheries agreement from Senate consideration.69 The non-
controversial boundary settlement treaty, which in the United States
view was generally the preferred first step in resolving the issues in
the Georges Bank area, received the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate on April 29, 1981. 70
The Canadian government, although not pleased with the separa-
tion of the treaties, eventually agreed to settle the boundary issue
independently, upon assurances from the United States government
that Canadian fishermen would be allowed to fish in all claimed ar-
eas until the boundary was finally adjudicated. 711 On November 20,
1981, the United States and Canada exchanged instruments of ratifi-
cation for the boundary settlement treaty.72
The boundary dispute was submitted to a special five judge cham-
ber of the ICJ.73 The chamber was asked to determine "in accor-
64. See Fisheries Agreement, supra note 61, art. 2.
65. See MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1851; Fisheries Agreement, supra note 61, art.
10.
66. Fisheries Agreement, supra note 61, Annexes A-C.
67. Id. art. 4 & Annexes A-C.
68. See generally Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty and East Coast Fisher-
ies Resources Agreement: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 22 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Maritime Boundary Settlement
Hearings].
69. See Feldman & Colson, supra note 2, at 760-61.
70. Id. at 761.
71. See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 287, para. 76.
72. Id.
73. See Boundary Treaty, supra note 4. The five-judge chamber was composed of
dance with the principles and rules of international law applicable in
the matter . ..the course of the single maritime boundary which
divides the continental shelf and fishery zones of the United States
and Canada . . . .,, The chamber announced a boundary line on
October 12, 1984.75 To a large extent, the line chosen by the cham-
ber dividing the disputed area was a compromise of the two conflict-
ing claims, and in that respect, the chamber's decision was not unex-
pected. On the other hand, the methodology and criteria applied by
the chamber were decidedly unexpected.
The chamber rejected both the United States and Canadian
claims as inappropriate or inequitable,76 and drew the boundary us-
ing geometric methods based on coastal geography. 77 Most surpris-
ing, however, was the pronouncement that, because the parties re-
quested a single boundary for the seabed and water column, the
chamber would exclude "application of any criterion found to be ex-
clusively bound up with the particular characteristics of one alone of
the two natural realities that have to be delimited in conjunction. 78
The chamber might just as well have said that it would not consider
anything that is particularly relevant.7 9 The chamber's approach not
only made most of the evidence compiled by the parties meaningless,
but precluded analysis of the issues relevant to fisheries zone delimi-
tation. This has ramifications not only for future boundary delimita-
tions, but also for fisheries management negotiations. An analysis by
three judges elected by the ICJ and one judge or judge ad hoc appointed by each party.
The members of the chamber were Judge Robert Ago of Italy, Judge Andre Gros of
France, Judge Hermann Nosier of the Federal Republic of Germany, Judge Stephen
Schwebel of the United States, and Judge ad hoc Maxwell Cohen of Canada. Schneider,
The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of An Equitable Result, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 539,
543 (1985). The case was expected to be of major significance because in addition to
being the first case concerning the delimitation of both a fisheries zone and continental
shelf, it was the first time the special chamber of the ICJ had been used. Id. at 541.
74. Boundary Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2(1).
75. The boundary line is illustrated in the Figure, supra p. 499. See Gulf of
Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246. For a more complete discussion of the decision, see generally
McDorman, Saunders, and VanderZwaag, supra note 30, and Schneider, supra note 73.
76. See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 320, para. 176.
77. Id. at 332, para. 212.
78. Id. at 326, para. 193. The chamber rejected a factor-by-factor analysis of
equitable principles and relevant criteria. Principles related to resources or economics
were considered only briefly at the final stage of the chamber's analysis of the delimita-
tion to determine whether the chosen boundary would "unexpectedly be revealed as radi-
cally inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for the liveli-
hood and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned." Id. at 342,
para. 237.
79. One group of commentators has criticized the "degree to which the decision's
rationale is divorced from the reason for the dispute, [because] the case was not about
geography but rather was centrally concerned with the allocation of rights to the use of
ocean resources . . . ." See McDorman, Saunders & VanderZwaag, supra note 30, at
101; see also Clain, Gulf of Maine-A Disappointing First in the Delimitation of a
Single Maritime Boundary, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 521, 599 (1985) (the author expresses the
view that the chamber's reasoning cannot be applied to future delimitations).
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the chamber may have been useful in defining the rights of nations
to traditional fisheries resources and in assessing the importance of
economic dependence on fisheries. These issues are presumed rele-
vant to fisheries zone delimitation and are also important to the
question of right of access to another country's fishery zone. A better
understanding of each nation's legal status concerning fisheries
rights could have been useful in future negotiations on cooperative
fisheries management.
Within two weeks of the chamber decision, United States and Ca-
nadian fishermen were limited to areas on their respective sides of
the Georges Bank boundary line. 0 Neither country's fishermen per-
ceived themselves "winners" in the dispute."' Although United
States fishermen called for a bilateral delay in boundary enforce-
ment, Canada swiftly rejected a formal State Department proposal
for a one year moratorium, which was intended to maintain the sta-
tus quo while the impact of the delimitation was assessed. 2
Future negotiations concerning reciprocal access and management
of shared stocks are inevitable, but the atmosphere at this point can
best be described as cautious. Because the United States provides the
major market for Canadian fish products, Canada anticipates that
the United States will attempt to link trade issues to fisheries ac-
cess.8 3 The New England congressional delegation, in a November
28, 1984, letter to the State Department, has warned that
"[n]egotiations on a comprehensive reciprocal fisheries treaty should
not commence until the fishing industry has had sufficient time and
information to fully assess the implications of the new boundary and
reach a consensus position in consultation with the departments of
State and Commerce. ''
MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Both the United States and Canada are relatively inexperienced in
the management of marine fisheries. It has only been a decade since
80. See McDorman, Saunders & VanderZwaag, supra note 30, at 90.
81. See generally U.S. Fishermen Distressed at World Court Decision, NAT'L
FISHERMAN, Dec. 1984, at 2, col. 1; Georges Bank Decision Upsets Canadian Fishermen,
NAT'L FISHERMAN, Jan. 1985, at 2, col. 4.
82. See Canada Rejects Boundary Moratorium on Georges, NAT'L FISHERMAN,
Feb. 1985, at 20, col. 1.
83. See Georges Bank Decision Upsets Canadian Fishermen, supra note 81, at
72, col. 3.
84. See Canada Rejects Boundary Moratorium on Georges, supra note 82, at 20,
col. 4.
the countries extended jurisdiction over fisheries to 200 miles. The
difficult process of developing management systems has often been
further complicated by political and economic pressures, and by the
insufficiency of scientific knowledge. It is apparent that there is still
much to learn from scientific, socioeconomic, and administrative per-
spectives. During this developmental period, two radically different
approaches to fishery management have emerged. This section will
provide an overview of the fisheries management regime of each
country8 5 and discuss how the two countries are dealing with the is-
sue of foreign access to its exclusive zone.
The United States
Prior to 1976, fisheries exploited by United States fishermen were
traditionally managed by individual states.86 The Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 197687 (MFCMA) not only
created an exclusive 200-mile FZ, but also established a comprehen-
sive management scheme at the federal level. State management of
territorial sea fisheries continues,88 but state input into the manage-
ment of the FZ is primarily through representation on Regional
Fishery Management Councils89 (FMCs). The New England FMC,
which has overall responsibility for fisheries in the Gulf of Maine-
Georges Bank area, is composed of principal state fisheries officials
from Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut;90 eleven members appointed by the Secretary of Com-
merce from lists of qualified individuals submitted by state gover-
nors;91 and the regional director of the, National Marine Fisheries
Service.92 The FMC also includes nonvoting representatives of theFish and Wildlife Service, the Coast Guard, the Marine Fisheries
85. For excellent in depth discussions of the United States and Canadian fisheries
management systems, see generally Snow, Extended Fishery Jurisdiction in Canada and
the United States, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 291 (1978); D. VANDERZWAAG. THE FISH
FEUD (1983) [hereinafter cited as THE FISH FEUD]; VanderZwaag, Canadian Fisheries
Management: A Legal and Administrative Overview, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 171
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Fisheries].
86. See generally Schoenbaum & McDonald, State Management of Marine
Fisheries after the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc., 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 17 (1977).
87. MFCMA, supra note 3.
88. Id. § 1856.
89. Id. § 1852. See generally Rogalski, The Unique Federalism of the Regional
Councils Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 9 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 163 (1980).
90. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1852(a)(1).
91. Id. § 1852(b)(1)(C). "Qualified individuals" are persons who are knowledgea-
ble or experienced in management, conservation, or recreational or commercial fishing in
the geographic area. Id. § 1852(b)(2)(A).
92. Id. § 1852(b)(1)(B).
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Commission, and the State Department.9
With the assistance of its staff, a Scientific and Statistical Com-
mittee, and additional advisors, 94 the FMC develops fishery manage-
ment plans (FMPs) consistent with the national standards set forth
in the MFCMA.9 5 FMPs must include a description and assessment
of the condition of the fishery and a determination of its optimum
yield.96 Domestic harvesting capacity, the portion of the optimum
yield available for foreign fishermen, and the extent to which United
States processors will use the domestic harvest must also be deter-
mined.9 7 Although it might appear from the foregoing description
that the role of the FMC involves simply applying finite figures in-
volving a scientifically determinable amount of fish and certain num-
ber of fishermen, the process is considerably less quantifiable than
managers would optimally desire, and involves as much policymak-
ing as it does mathematics.
The single most important determination made by the FMC is the
calculation of optimum yield. The MFCMA provides that the opti-
mum yield is the amount of fish that will "provide the greatest over-
all benefit to the Nation, with particular reference to food produc-
tion and recreational opportunities."'98 The actual yield is determined
by reference to the scientific determination of maximum sustainable
yield, modified by "any relevant economic, social, or ecological fac-
tor." 99 It is interesting to note that optimum yield does not have to
be expressed in terms of a specific amount of fish. It may be ex-
pressed in such terms as the amount of fish harvested in certain ar-
eas or during certain seasons or with a particular type of gear.100
The Atlantic groundfish management plan, for example, sets opti-
mum yield by prescribing the type of gear that may be used in cer-
93. Id. § 1852(c).
94. Id. § 1852(g).
95. Id. § 1851(a)(I)-(7). In summary, the seven national standards require fish-
ery management plans to establish nondiscriminatory conservation and management
measures based on the best scientific information to assure optimum yield. Fisheries
should be managed throughout their range and measures should be taken to promote
efficiency and avoid duplication.
96. Id. § 1853(a).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 1802(18)(A).
99. Id. § 1802(18)(B). Professor Burke describes the definition of optimum yield
as having "two components, one expressing the objective (content) and the other provid-
ing for the concrete means of formulating and expressing it (procedural)." See Burke,
U.S. Fishery Management and the New Law of the Sea, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 24, 36
(1982).
100. See 50 C.F.R. § 602.11(e)(4) (1984).
tain areas and designating certain areas as closed during March,
April, and May.' 10
The FMP is submitted for approval to the Secretary of Com-
merce 0 2 (Secretary) along with proposed regulations for implement-
ing the plans.10 3 Within ninety-five days the Secretary must approve,
disapprove, or partially disapprove the plan. 04 The 1983 amend-
ments to the MFCMA10 5 imposed strict timetables for secretarial
action on FMPs 0 6 and abbreviated time periods for promulgation of
regulations for their implementation.0 7 If the Secretary fails to act
within the mandated schedule, an FMP automatically becomes effec-
tive, 10 8 and the Secretary must promulgate the proposed regula-
tions. 109 Ostensibly, these revisions in the FMP procedures were
made to improve the efficiency of the FMP development and imple-
mentation process. 1 0 The amendments, however, potentially may re-
sult in a much greater role for the councils in determining domestic
fisheries.
Public participation at all stages of development of FMPs is an
important part of the process. Meetings of the FMCs, their commit-
tees, and advisory panels are generally public"' and provide an op-
portunity for discussion of fishery plans and council actions. In addi-
tion, the FMCs must hold public meetings on FMPs in major ports
and affected areas." 2 The environmental impact statement proce-
dures of the National Environmental Policy Act" 3 (NEPA) create
101. See id. § 651.20-.22.
102. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1854.
103. Id. § 1853(c).
104. Id. § 1854(b)(l)-(2).
105. Pub. L. No. 97-453, 96 Stat. 2487 (1983) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).
106. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1854. A 75-day comment period follows submission
of an FMP to the Secretary. Id. § 1854(a)(1)(B). The Secretary must notify a FMC of
approval, disapproval, or partial disapproval of an FMP within 20 days of the close of the
comment period. If no action is taken by the Secretary, the plan becomes effective auto-
matically. Id. § 1854(b)(1).
107. Id. § 1855(c). Regulations to implement FMPs must be promulgated within
110 days of the date the FMC submits a plan. Regulations for plans resubmitted by the
FMC after disapproval must be promulgated within 75 days.
108. Id. § 1854(b)(1).
109. Id. § 1855(c).
110. The former legislation (16 U.S.C. 1854(a)(1976)) required secretarial action
within 60 days, but the action was often not timely and the FMP process ground to a
halt. The running of the public comment period with the secretarial review period helps
to expedite the process. These revisions to the MFCMA, however, have not completely
resolved the problems related to the length of time involved in promulgating FMPs. The
FMCs themselves are under no specific time limits for developing FMPs. In addition, the
start of Secretary's strict timetable is tolled until an adequate EIS is submitted.
11. See 50 C.F.R. § 601.24(b)(4) (1984). Meetings may be closed or partially
closed when they relate to matters of national security, employment matters, or briefing
on pending litigation. Id. § 601.24(b)(4)(vi)(B).
112. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1852(h)(3).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 308-11. See
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additional opportunities for public participation. The MFCMA also
provides for a seventy-five day comment period following submittal
of the FMPs to the Secretary 114 and an additional thirty day period
for comment on amended plans which have been resubmitted follow-
ing secretarial disapproval." 5
Perhaps because of the emphasis on public participation in the
FMP development process, the MFCMA restricts judicial review of
regulations promulgated to implement the FMPs.116 Petitions for re-
view must be filed within thirty days of the promulgation of the reg-
ulations,1 17 and a court may not enjoin implementation of the regula-
tion pending review. 1"8 A court may set aside a regulation only if it
is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law,""19 or if promulgation of the regulation
fails to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements. 20
While the standard of review is not extraordinary, the narrow scope
of review, combined with the time limitations and the denial of court
authority to issue preliminary injunctions, makes the MFCMA
atypical.' 2'
Determination of the amount of fish available for foreign fisher-
men in the exclusive United States FZ is part of the FMP process.
Through FMPs, the councils establish the total allowable level of
foreign fishing (TALFF), 22 and may also impose conservation and
management measures such as gear restrictions and designated fish-
123ing areas.
Because the MFCMA creates an absolute priority for the United
States fishing industry, the TALFF is limited to the portion of the
optimum yield not harvested by domestic fishermen. 24 A simple
formula of optimum yield minus domestic harvesting capacity was
originally used to calculate the TALFF. 26 A 1980 amendment to
also Rogalski, supra note 89, at 181.
114. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1854(a)(1)(B).
115. Id. § 1854(b)(3)(B)(ii).
116. See generally Comment, Judicial Review of Fishery Management Regula-
tions under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REv.
599 (1977).
117. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1855(d).
118. Id. § 1855(d)(1).
119. See id. § 1855(d)(2); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1977).
120. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1855(d)(2). See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)-(D).
121. Comment, supra note 116, at 603.
122. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1853(a)(4)(B).
123. Id. § 1853(a)(2).
124. Id. § 1853(a)(4)(B).
125. See id. § 1821(d)(2)(A).
the MFCMA, the American Fisheries Promotion Act,126 provides
FMCs with an alternative formula for calculating TALFF. 2 7 The
new formula is an attempt by Congress to deal with what is per-
ceived as a "Catch 22" for fisheries industry development. That is,
for the industry to develop, not only fish, but markets must be avail-
able. So long as foreign fishermen were supplying relatively inexpen-
sive fish from the United States FZ to domestic and foreign markets,
the United States industry could not effectively compete and expand.
Nonetheless, prior to 1980 the MFCMA permitted foreign fishing to
continue at the same levels unless actual domestic harvesting capac-
ity increased. The 1980 amendment providing an alternative TALFF
allocation formula is essentially a program for phasing out foreign
fishing in the FZ, based on reductions in TALFF beyond actual in-
creases in domestic harvesting capacity. 2 One commentator notes
that the application of this formula could eliminate foreign fishing in
the United States FZ by 1990.129
Once the TALFF is established, the Secretary of State, in cooper-
ation with the Secretary of Commerce, determines the allocation of
fish among foreign nations'"0 that have signed Governing Interna-
tional Fishery Agreements' 31 (GIFAs). Originally, the factors con-
sidered in determining allocations focused on a country's traditional
fishing in the area, and its cooperation with the United States in
fisheries research and enforcement of fisheries regulations. 32 Al-
though the list of factors contains no provision for special deference
to neighboring countries or countries that share fish stocks, it does
include a general provision allowing consideration of other matters
deemed "appropriate."' 33 The 1980 amendments to MFCMA added
factors emphasizing United States fisheries industry development
and trade policy.' 34 This so-called "fish and chips policy" links entry
into the FZ to affirmative acts by a country which reduce trade bar-
126. Pub. L. No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3296 (1980) (codified at scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.).
127. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1821(d)(2)(A) or (B).
128. Id. § 1821(d). See generally Note, Fishery Conservation: Is the Categorical
Exclusion of Foreign Fleets the Next Step?, 12 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 154 (1982).
129. See THE FisH FEUD, supra note 85, at 43. The author also notes that because
1979 harvests are used as base figures for the complex reduction formula, and since
Canada has had no harvest in United States waters in 1979, the application of the
formula would preclude Canadian fishing in the United States FZ. Id. at 57 n.59.
130. MFCMA, supra note 3, § 1821(e)(1)(A).
131. Id. § 1821(a), (c). In signing a GIFA, a country must make a commitment to
follow United States fishery regulations and be subject to United States inspection and
enforcement. A country must also pay for various other items such as observers aboard
their vessels, fishing fees, and the costs of loss or damage to any United States fishing
vessels or their gear. Id. § 1821(c)(1)-(2).
132. Id. § 1821(e)(1)(E)(iii), (vi)-(vii).
133. Id. § 1821(e)(l)(E)(viii).
134. Id. § 1821(e)(1)(E)(i)-(ii), (iv)-(v).
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riers and create markets for United States fish exports.13 5 The Secre-
tary's consideration of "whether . ..such nation requires the fish
harvested from the [FZ] for its domestic consumption"13 6 might be
interpreted altruistically as favoring nations that are dependent upon
a fishery as a food source. In the context of the fish and chips policy,
however, one can infer that the real consideration is whether the fish
will be re-imported into the United States. Because of the high de-
gree of competition between Canadian-caught and United States-
caught fish in northeastern United States markets, these considera-
tions are likely to be major factors in future negotiations between the
two countries.
Canada
While the United States fisheries management regime emphasizes
formal procedures, bifurcation of authority in plan development and
implementation, and a high degree of public accountability, the Ca-
nadian regime emphasizes informality, flexibility, and centralization
of authority. The Constitution Act of 1982, continues the grant of
exclusive federal control over fisheries first established by the Consti-
tution Act of 1867.137 The Fisheries Act' 38 and the Coastal Fisheries
Protection Act'39 provide the source of authority for the Canadian
Cabinet and the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (Minister) to
manage domestic and foreign fishing. 40
The Fisheries Act grants the Canadian Cabinet power to promul-
gate regulations for every phase of fisheries operations from licensing
and operating fishing vessels to the landing, handling, and transport
of fish.'41 The Minister has absolute discretion in the administration
of fisheries leases and licenses . 42
135. Id.
136. Id. § 1821(e)(1)(E)(iv).
137. The Constitution Act, 1982, was proclaimed on April 17, 1982. The act also
renamed the British North American Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3; the Constitution
Act, 1867. In spite of the apparently clear designation in the federal government, judicial
decisions have opened the door for provincial claims. See Canadian Fisheries, supra note
85, at 172-76; Fairley, Canadian Federalism, Fisheries and the Constitution: External
Constraints on Internal Ordering, 12 OTTAWA L. REV. 256, 259-90 (1980).
138. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. F-14 (1970).
139. Id. ch. C-21 (1970).
140. The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act prohibits foreign fishing unless author-
ized by regulations promulgated by the Canadian Cabinet. Id. § 3. Section 7 of the
Fisheries Act, supra note 138, gives the Minister of Fisheries and Forestry "absolute
discretion" in issuing domestic licenses.
141. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. F-14, § 34 (1970).
142. Id. § 7.
The Department of Fisheries and Oceans is organized in four
main sections: Atlantic Fisheries; Pacific and Freshwater Fisheries;
Economic Development and Marketing; and Ocean Science and
Surveys.143 The management of the Georges Bank fisheries is the
responsibility of Atlantic Fisheries and its Scotia-Fundy regional of-
fice, which carries out much of the management activity.144 The
branches and divisions of the regional office deal with all phases of
fisheries management and development which include scientific re-
search, economic studies, and technology development as well as the
actual management of the fisheries. 145
Although there is a clearly identified administrative structure, the
administrative processes involved in fishery management plan devel-
opment are anything but clearly defined. 14 The use of informal con-
sultations, ever-changing advisory groups, and the lack of official
published guidelines have been cited as reasons why management
plan development is so difficult to document.1 47 Primarily through
interviews with fisheries officials, one researcher has reconstructed
the planmaking process for several Atlantic fisheries. 14 In each case
the procedures have varied. Although it is extremely difficult to gen-
eralize, a summary of the general approach to planning for Atlantic
fisheries will suffice to distinguish the process from United States
fishery management planning.
Scientific data, such as the condition of the fishery, stock assess-
ments, and the recommended total allowable catch is provided by the
Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Advisory Committee and re-
viewed by the directors of the regional offices. Federal fisheries offi-
cials prepare a draft plan which is then reviewed by various formal
and informal industry advisory groups. Refinement of the draft plan
and further review by the regional directors or the appropriate re-
gional director is generally followed by review by the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans.1 49 There is a great deal of variation depending
on whether the plans are developed for a region or for the entire
143. For a complete discussion of the administrative structure of the Canadian
Department of Fisheries, see generally THE FISH FEUD, supra note 85, at 69-72, and
Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85, at 181-85.
144. THE FisH FEUD, supra note 85, at 69-72; Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85,
at 181-85.
145. THE FisH FEUD, supra note 85, at 69-72; Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85,
at 181-85.
146. VanderZwaag describes the Canadian fisheries management system as
"somewhat like a ghost ship. . . the system exists but it often lies veiled under a myste-
rious mist of flexibility and informality." Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85, at 172.
147. See THE FISH FEUD, supra note 85, at 72; Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85,
at 185.
148. See THE FISH FEUD, supra note 85, at 72-76; Canadian Fisheries, supra note
85 at 185-88.
149. THE FisH FEUD, supra note 'o5, at 72-76; Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85,
at 185-88.
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Atlantic fishery. 150 Advisory committees and working groups vary in
each of the regions, 51 and there are few formal mechanisms for in-
dustry and public input except for these committees and working
groups. A great deal of informal consultation with both fishermen
and processors is, however, an important element in plan
development.
One commentator has compared the difference in public participa-
tion in FMP development in Canada and the United States to the
difference between a boardroom decision and a town hall meeting.
15 2
In Canada, once the plan is completed and implemented, aggrieved
members of the public or fishing industry have little chance of ob-
taining court review of regulations promulgated under the Minister's
broad discretionary authority. 53 Redress must generally be sought
through the political, rather than the judicial, system.
The determination of total allowable catch (TAG) for domestic
and foreign fishermen in Canadian fishery plans is intended to in-
clude economic, social, and political, as well as environmental con-
siderations.15 4 Although this sounds very much like the concept of
optimum yield, there is a basic difference. The biological reference
point for TAC-called FO.1-is approximately ten to twenty per-
150. THE FISH FEUD, supra note 85, at 72-76; Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85,
at 185-88. For example, final review of plans that apply only to a region may be made by
the director general of the region rather than by the Minister.
151. The fact that advisory groups are so numerous and constantly changing
makes it impossible to identify them all or even establish how many exist. See THE FISH
FEUD, supra note 85, at 72.
152. Snow, supra note 85, at 309. Snow states:
Consultation with Canadian fishermen is on an informal, individual level and
consists of managers contacting union and company leaders when they want
their advice or cooperation. Instead of being built on closed meetings, [and] ad
hoc discussions with the domestic fleet ... leading to an unsupported TAC,
the American procedure for establishing optimum yield is constructed around a
series of public meetings and hearings to receive citizen input, culminating in a
detailed fishery management plan that is exposed to the rigors of scientific,
economic, and legal criticism. The development of these plans and the accom-
panying public debate are a central feature of the American system and pro-
vide a striking contrast to the Canadian approach, where the only public docu-
ment is the TAC.
Id. at 310 (emphasis added). Snow tempers his criticism somewhat, however, by noting
that "[w]hat the American system gains over the Canadian system in terms of public
input into the decisionmaking process must be measured against what is lost in flexibil-
ity." Id.
153. See id. at 323.
154. See Copes, Implementing Canada's Marine Fisheries Policy: Objectives,
Hazardsand Constraints, 6 MARINE POL'Y 219, 223-24 (1982); Snow, supra note 85, at
307; Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85, at 186, 205 n.117.
cent less than maximum sustainable yield155 and thus results in con-
servative determinations for catch allocations. Biologists see this as a
way to rebuild exhausted fisheries, while economists believe this
method will improve the economic efficiency of fisheries.115 With the
exception of scallops and lobster,157 TAC is generally expressed in
quotas for various classes of fishing vessels and specific areas.158
The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act provides authority for the
Canadian Cabinet to control entry to Canadian fishing zones by reg-
ulating the activities of foreign fishermen. 159 Neither the act nor its
implementing regulations, 60 however, contain guidelines for deter-
mining the conditions for foreign entry or the method of allocating
the foreign TAC. Again, discretion and flexibility are the major ele-
ments of the regime. The Canadian government has, however, gener-
ally tied foreign access to surplus stocks to either trade or conserva-
tion concessions. 61 This policy of seeking "commensurate benefits"
bears considerable similarity to the United States fish and chips pol-
icy. In addition to tariff reductions, the Canadian government has
negotiated for such concessions as the use of Canadian ports and
processing facilities, 6 2 transfer of fishing technology, and the obser-
vance of conservation measures beyond the Canadian FZ for fisher-
ies of importance to Canada. 63
HYDROCARBON DEVELOPMENT OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF
Although fisheries conflicts have been the major focus of interna-
tional attention and negotiations,6 there are at least two aspects of
hydrocarbon development in the Georges Bank region that have seri-
ous transnational implications. First, because current patterns on
Georges Bank are circular, pollutants from drilling operations or oil
spills in United States or Canadian waters can be transported to the
155. See Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85, at 205 n.118; THE FISH FEUD, supra
note 85, at 84 n.54.
156. See Canadian Fisheries, supra note 85, at 205 n.118; see also Copes, supra
note 154, at 224.
157. See THE FISH FEUD, supra note 85, at 75.
158. See generally id. at 74. It should also be noted that virtually all Canadian
fisheries are limited entry.
159. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. C-21, §§ 3-4 (1970).
160. See Can. Gaz., Vol. 4, ch. 413 (amended through 1985).
161. See Copes, supra note 154, at 232-33.
162. Canada currently has more processing capacity than it has fish landed, espe-
cially during certain seasons. Therefore, using fish caught by foreign vessels is considered
a benefit to local economies rather than as unhealthy competition for domestic fishermen.
See generally THE FISH FEUD, supra note 85, at 77-78.
163. See Copes, supra note 154, at 232-33.
164. Transboundary oil reserves were a topic in early stages of the Georges Bank
negotiations. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
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other nation's waters.1 6 5 The second problem involves the exploita-
tion of transboundary reservoirs of hydrocarbons. If Georges Bank
holds reserves of oil and gas, 166 it is likely that common pools will
exist in the area of the boundary line. Neither equity nor good man-
agement and conservation practices are likely to be served by al-
lowing "drainage" by the first country which exploits this common
reservoir.167
In both the United States and Canada, the legal framework for
outer continental shelf (OCS) development is more complicated than
for fisheries management. Although this complexity is due primarily
to the historical development of the law, other relevant factors in-
clude the concerns of adjacent coastal states and provinces about the
environmental and economic effects of OCS development, and the
desire of the states and provinces to share revenues from offshore oil
leasing and production. An analysis of the law applicable to hydro-
carbon development of Georges Bank must, of necessity, include an
explanation of the jurisdictional conflicts in both the United States
and Canada, as well as an overview of the schemes for leasing off-
shore areas.
The United States-The Tidelands Controversy and Beyond
The dispute between the federal and state governments over the
ownership of submerged lands adjacent to the coasts did not arise
until after the Truman Proclamation was issued. 168 This dispute be-
came known as the Tidelands Controversy. Prior to the 1940's, state
ownership of the tidelands (the wetlands between the low- and high-
165. See McDorman, Saunders & VanderZwaag, supra note 30, at 106.
166. Id. These authors note that the future of hydrocarbon exploration on Georges
Bank is in doubt at this time. United States oil companies have shown no interest in the
latest Georges Bank lease sale, and Canadian companies are focusing efforts in the Sable
Island area and the Hibernia field off Newfoundland.
167. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 52, para. 97. In
describing factors that should be considered in a continental shelf boundary delimitation,
the ICJ noted that "it frequently occurs that the same deposit lies on both sides of the
line dividing a continental shelf between two States, and since it is possible to exploit
such a deposit from either side, a problem immediately arises on account of the risk of
prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or other of the States concerned." Id. The ICJ
suggested unity of deposits as a criteria in delimitation, but "unitization" has become the
more traditional means of conserving and equitably dividing transboundary pools. Uni-
tization involves an agreement by the parties to treat the common reserve as one unit,
making it possible to control extraction, maximize production, and equitably divide oil
and gas produced. For a discussion of the policies and issues involved in unitization, see
Mosburg, Unitization-An Overview, in FUNDAMENTALS OF OIL & GAS LAW & TAXA-
TION 483-515 (J. Lowe ed. 1984).
168. See Truman Proclamation, supra note 31.
tide lines) was undisputed. 169 There seemed to be little doubt that
the submerged lands and the resources of the territorial sea were
owned by the states rather than the federal government.11 0 Several
factors, however, prompted the federal government to assert an ex-
clusive claim to the territorial sea and continental shelf. Overfishing
by Japan off the country's west coast and the need to defend against
enemy submarines were offered as two reasons for the federal asser-
tion of jurisdiction.1 11 The primary basis for the government's
change of position, however, was the growing importance of oil and
gas and the concomitant development of technology enabling the ex-
ploitation of offshore petroleum resources.1 7 2
By early May of 1945, the Truman Proclamation claiming United
States jurisdiction over the continental shelf was being formu-
lated.113 Later that month, on May 29, the Justice Department filed
suit to challenge California's territorial sea leases and claims to
marine mineral reserves.' 74 The Truman Proclamation, issued on
September 28, 1945, publicly announced the United States position
but did not "touch upon the question of Federal versus State con-
trol. 1 75 Together, the two actions signaled the decision of the fed-
eral government to assert exclusive jurisdiction over the seabed and
subsoil of the territorial sea and continental shelf.
In United States v. California17 6 and its progeny, 7 7 the Supreme
Court ruled that the federal government has paramount rights to the
territorial sea. This resolution was short lived. The Submerged
Lands Act18 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act1 79 (OC-
SLA), both enacted in 1953, effectively transferred title to the three-
mile territorial sea to the states while retaining for the federal gov-
ernment the continental shelf seaward of that boundary.
169. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845); see also Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
170. See generally OFFICE OF OCEAN, RESOURCE AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY COORDI-
NATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OCEAN MANAGEMENT: SEEKING A NEW PERSPEC-
TIVE 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as OCEAN MANAGEMENT].
171. See L. JUDA, OCEAN SPACE RIGHTS: DEVELOPING U.S. POLICY 11-17 (1975).
172. See generally OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 170, at 7-12; Ball, Good Old
American Permits: Madisonian Federalism on the Territorial Sea and Continental
Shelf, 12 ENVTL. L. 623, 624-30 (1982).
173. See OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 170, at 12.
174. Id. at 7, 13. California had been leasing offshore areas under authority of a
1921 state act that reserved offshore mineral deposits for the state and established leas-
ing procedures.
175. 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. 484-85 (1945).
176. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
177. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707 (1950).
178. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-15 (1982).
179. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1982 & Supp. 1985). See generally Walz & Leg-
gette, United States Jurisdiction Over the 200-Mile Maritime Zone, 23 San Diego L.
Rev. 545 (1986).
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This solution has never been fully accepted by the coastal states
which have continued to contest it. 80 Technically, each seabed juris-
diction case resolved only the relative rights of the national govern-
ment and the state involved in the litigation.'' The Submerged
Lands Act also provided no final resolution to continued state off-
shore claims, because its cession of the territorial sea had been
phrased in the form of a quitclaim' 82 and was without prejudice to
claims beyond three miles.'"" In the 1970's, the Atlantic states'
claim to the continental shelf was contested by the federal govern-
ment. 84 The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Maine'85
reaffirmed federal continental shelf jurisdiction to the Atlantic conti-
nental shelf, including the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank region.
While the courts clarified jurisdictional lines, Congress, in recogni-
tion of legitimate state interests and environmental concerns, enacted
legislation which gave the state a voice in the offshore development
process and appropriated funds to deal with the effects of energy
development. The OCSLA of 1953 established a federal leasing au-
thority that was basically "a closed system controlled by oil compa-
nies and the Secretary of Interior."" Much of the legislation en-
acted in recent years has been aimed at revising this system. 87 This
section of this Article will focus on the most significant legisla-
tion-the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),'8 8 the 1978
OCSLA amendments, 89 and the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA).I'°
Passed in 1969, NEPA requires that federal agencies consider the
environmental consequences of their actions and that they include a
180. See generally Ball, supra note 172, at 630.
181. "Of course, the defendant States were not parties to United States v. Califor-
nia ... and they are not precluded by res judicata from litigating the issues decided by
[that] case." United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 527 (1975).
182. 43 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1) (1982). "The United States releases and relinquishes
... all right, title, and interest of the United States, if any it has ... " Id.
183. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982).
184. See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
185. Id.
186. Ball, supra note 172, at 652.
187. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1985); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1985); Marine Pro-
tection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1985).
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as NEPA].
NEPA will be discussed in more detail in the section on environmental assessment. See
infra text accompanying notes 296-383.
189. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978) (codified at scattered sections of 16,
30, and 43 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as OCSLA amendments].
190. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1985) [hereinafter cited as CZMA].
"detailed statement" of predicted environmental impact when pro-
posing "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment." 191 Although not directed specifically at
OCS activities, NEPA theoretically provides both the states, and the
public, with a mechanism for participation in OCS decisionmaking
through participation in the preparation of environmental impact
statements192 (EISs) and the opportunity to judicially challenge the
adequacy of completed EISs. Such judicial challenges have been a
prime tactic for delaying or halting OCS lease sales. 193 At least two
commentators have noted, however, that the "chief effect of NEPA"
is not to involve the states in the decisionmaking process, but to give
states "time to build political opposition to block the leasing."194
The 1978 OCSLA amendments 195 represented the first "overhaul"
of the act in twenty-five years. They also institutionalized state par-
ticipation in OCS development. The amendments specify that the
Secretary of Interior must prepare comprehensive, five year lease
plans 96 and require approval, by the Secretary, of exploration 97 and
development 9 8 plans before a leaseholder may proceed with OCS
activities. The Secretary of Interior must not only consult governors
of "affected states"1 9 for comment during preparation of the five
191. See NEPA, supra note 188, § 4332.
192. See id. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1598 (1985). Environmental impact
statements are required for the issuance of leases. Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). (the adoption of exploration or production plans
may also require an EIS).
193. See, e.g., Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978); County of Suf-
folk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977); Natural Resources, 458
F.2d at 827; Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685 (D. Mass. 1979); California v.
Morton, 404 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
194. Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf Min-
eral Resources, 28 STAN L. REV. 1107, 1130 (1976); Ball, supra note 172, at 645-46.
195. For a complete discussion of the OCSLA amendments, see generally Jones,
Mead, & Sorenson, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 19
NAT. RESOURCES J. 885 (1979); Krueger & Singer, An Analysis of the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 909 (1979).
196. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
197. Id. § 1340.
198. Id. § 1351.
199. Id. § 1331(0. An "affected state" includes any state:
(3) which ... will receive oil for processing, refining, or transshipment which
was extracted from the outer Continental Shelf and transported directly to
such State by means of vessels...(4) which is designated by the Secretary as a State in which there is a substan-
tial probability of significant impact on or damage to the coastal, marine, or
human environment, or a State in which there will be significant changes in the
social, government, or economic infrastructure, resulting from the exploration,
development, and production of oil and gas anywhere on the outer Continental
Shelf; or
(5) in which the Secretary finds that because of such activity there is, or will
be, a significant risk of serious damage, due to factors such as prevailing winds
and currents, to the marine or coastal environment in the event of any oilspill,
blowout, or release of oil or gas from vessels, pipelines, or other transshipment
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year lease plans, 200 but must also accept recommendations by the
governors as to the "size, timing, and location" of particular lease
sales201 if the recommendations strike "a reasonable balance between
the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected
state. 20 2 Environmental and technical studies undertaken in con-
junction with lease sales must be coordinated with affected states. 03
A lessee may not commence drilling until an exploration plan, con-
sistent with state coastal management programs,20 4 has been ap-
proved by the Secretary. 20 5 If exploration is successful, state gover-
nors are again consulted for recommendations concerning the lessee's
plan for development and production. 20 6 These recommendations
must also be adopted by the Secretary unless they do not represent a
reasonable balance of state and national interests.207
Although the OCSLA amendments requiring acceptance of state
recommendations concerning leasing and development plans, except
under certain conditions,208 appear to give the states a preeminent
role in OCS decisionmaking, this is not necessarily the case. Review
of a decision by the Secretary of Interior not to adopt state recom-
mendations is extremely limited. For example, in California v.
Watt,20 9 the district court noted that "[a]lthough the Secretary quite
clearly violated the spirit of the [OCSLA], giving due deference to
his judgment, it cannot be said that his determination to reject rec-
ommendations submitted by Governor Brown was 'arbitrary and
capricious.' ,121
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972211 provides to the
states a third point of entry into the OCS development process. The
CZMA was originally intended to protect coastal resources by en-
couraging states to develop protection and management plans for
facilities....
200. Id. § 1344(c).
201. Id. § 1345(a).
202. Id. § 1345(c).
203. Id. § 1346(c).
204. Id. § 1340(c)(2). See infra text accompanying footnotes 213-22 for a discus-
sion of the federal consistency provision.
205. 43 U.S.C. § 1340.
206. Id. § 1345(a).
207. Id. § 1345(c).
208. Id.
209. 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), afd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in
part, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
210. 520 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
211. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1985).
their coastal areas.212 Two inducements related to OCS development
have been offered to the states to develop programs meeting federal
guidelines: economic assistance 213 and the so-called "federal consis-
tency" requirement. 214 The consistency provision requires federally
conducted or supported activities directly affecting the coastal zone
to be carried out "in a manner which is, to the maximum extent
practicable, consistent with [federally approved] state management
program[s]. ' 12 5 The CZMA does not provide for state participation
in policy decisions, but creates, on its face, only an opportunity for
states to block implementation of federal decisions. The obvious solu-
tion to the potential for conflict created by this situation was identi-
fied by the federal district court in California v. Watt.216 The court
concluded that the most efficient means for resolving conflict and
achieving consistency was to include the coastal states from the be-
ginning of the OCS development planning process.217
The CZMA was amended in connection with the 1978 OCSLA
amendments to specifically provide that OCS oil and gas exploration,
development, and production affecting a state's coastal zone require
state concurrence that the activity is consistent with its management
plan. 218 Although it had been generally assumed that the original
federal consistency provision applied to federal lease sales,219 the
United States Supreme Court recently held that leasing does not di-
rectly affect the coastal zone and thus does not trigger the consis-
tency requirement.220 Moreover, the Court indicated that the 1978
amendments, requiring the consistency of exploration and develop-
ment plans, evidenced congressional intent that only those later
stages of OCS planning require consistency review. 221 The CZMA
was reauthorized in 1986, but no language was added to clarify the
intent of Congress concerning the application of the consistency pro-
vision to OCS lease sales. 22
Since losing the battle for ownership of the OCS, states have
sought to protect their coasts and citizens from the environmental
and economic effects of offshore energy development. The coastal
states have continued, however, to press their case for a share of the
revenues generated by offshore leasing and oil production. The
212. See id. § 1452.
213. See id. §§ 1454-1455.
214. Id. § 1456(c)(1).
215. Id.
216. 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
217. Id. at 1370.
218. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3) (1985).
219. See, e.g., California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
220. California v. Watt, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
221. Id. at 334-41.
222. See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF., 16 ENV'T REP. (Apr. 11, 1986).
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states' arguments are that coastal states are negatively impacted by
continental shelf development and should be compensated, and that
their interest is analogous to the situation of federal resources within
states.
Congress has already responded, at least partially, to the argu-
ment that coastal states should receive compensable damage from
OCS development. In addition to the loans, guarantees, and grants
made to the states for development and implementation of their
coastal management programs,223 the CZMA includes Coastal En-
ergy Impact Program (CEIP) grants. 24 CEIP grants are made to
coastal states based upon a formula which includes such factors as
the amount of adjacent continental shelf acreage leased, the volume
of oil and gas produced on the adjacent shelf, and the amount of oil
and gas that first comes ashore in the state.2 25 CEIP funds may be
used to provide public services, build facilities necessitated by OCS
development, and prevent or mitigate unavoidable loss of recrea-
tional or environmental resources from energy development. 26 Since
CEIP grants and coastal plan implementation rely on budget alloca-
tions, rather than on a guaranteed share of offshore revenues, neither
program is likely to continue to withstand attempts to eliminate its
funding.221 7
The states have also argued that their interest in continental shelf
resources is analogous to the situation of federal resources located
within a state's boundaries. When resources are developed on federal
lands within a state, the state is entitled to a share of the federal
royalties and may also impose a severance tax.2 At present, coastal
states neither share in revenues nor have the power to tax severed
minerals. In the case of nearshore federal leases that encroach on
state boundaries, however, Congress recently has acted to provide
223. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455 (1985).
224. See id. § 1456(a).
225. Id. § 1456(b)(2).
226. Id. § 1456(c).
227. President Reagan has "zero budgeted" coastal zone programs since 1981,
only to have Congress reinstate some continued funding for federal and state coastal
management. See Administration of the CZM Program Oversight: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (1983); Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy
Study of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2, 33 (1985).
228. See Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 191 (Supp. 1985) (as amended)
(providing that 50% of royalties are payable to states in which mined federal land lies);
see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (upholding Mon-
tana's 30% severence tax).
compensation and revenue sharing.2 9 Enactment of a system of
straight revenue sharing of other OCS proceeds with coastal states is
unlikely.
Canada's Offshore Jurisdiction-A Political Resolution
Early development of the Canadian offshore jurisdictional dispute
basically paralleled the United States experience. The Constitution
Act of 186730 sets forth the distribution of rights and powers in the
Canadian federal system. The federal government has exclusive ju-
risdiction over fishing, shipping and navigation, customs, and inter-
national trade.231 At the time of confederation, the original prov-
inces232 retained ownership of lands, minerals, and royalties. 233 But
the Act was silent as to the question of offshore ownership and
authority.
In 1967, the Canadian Supreme Court in Reference re Offshore
Mineral Rights of British Columbia234 held that the federal govern-
ment controls the resources of the territorial sea and continental
shelf. As in the case of the Atlantic and Gulf states, other Canadian
coastal provinces were not precluded from claiming rights in offshore
areas by the initial determination of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada.235 On Canada's Atlantic coast, however, it was clear that the
jurisdictional dispute was an impediment to offshore oil and gas
development.236
Canada's federal-provincial conflicts are generally resolved by ne-
gotiation rather than by resort to the Supreme Court. 37 Recognition
229. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-272, Title VIII, §§ 8001-8005, 100 Stat. 147-51 (1986).
230. Formerly entitled the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3
[hereinafter cited as Constitution Act, 1867].
231. Id. § 92.
232. The four original provinces are now New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario,
and Quebec.
233. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 230, § 109.
234. 1967 S.C.R. 792.
235. See, e.g., Foley, Nova Scotia's Case for Coastal and Offshore Resources, 13
OTTAWA L. REV. 281 (1981); Douglas, Conflicting Claims to Oil and Natural Gas Re-
sources Off the Eastern Coast of Canada, 18 ALTA. L. REV. 54 (1980); Harrison, Juris-
diction in Canada's Offshore: A Sea of Confusion, 17 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 469 (1979);
Martin, Newfoundland's Case on Offshore Minerals: A Brief Outline, 7 OTTAWA L.
REV. 34 (1975); Beauchamp, Crommelin, & Thompson, Jurisdictional Problems in Can-
ada's Offshore, I1 ALTA. L. REV. 431 (1973).
236. See generally Head, The Legal Clamor Over Canadian Offshore Minerals, 5
ALTA. L. REV. 312, 313-14 (1967); Swan, Remembering "Maine:" Offshore Federalism
in the United States and Canada, 6 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 296, 318-19 (1976).
237. See Swan, supra note 236, at 311-12. Swan's article points out that American
states are in a weaker bargaining position than the Canadian provinces vis-a-vis the fed-
eral government, and therefore, are likely to prefer impartial adjudication of disputes. In
addition, the Constitution Act, 1867, was often perceived by Canadian politicians as "so
outdated as to be irrelevant to contemporary problem-solving." Swan, supra note 236, at
312.
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of the jurisdictional dispute as an impediment to offshore develop-
ment, and the need for economic activity in the Atlantic provinces,2 38
led the federal government to seek a political, rather than judicial,
solution to the problem. The result was more than a decade of nego-
tiations intended to set aside jurisdictional differences and provide a
framework for cooperative administration and management of min-
eral resources off the east coast.
In 1977, the federal government and the provinces of Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island23 9 signed a memorandum
of understanding2 40 concerning revenue sharing and joint administra-
tion of offshore resources." 1 The regime was to be implemented
through a formal, comprehensive agreement providing for exclusive
provincial management of resources of the adjacent seabed within
five kilometers of the coast and administration of the area seaward
of that boundary by a Maritime Offshore Resources Board.242 The
Board was to have six members-three federal representatives and a
member representing each province.243 In general, revenues would
have been shared on the basis of twenty-five percent to Canada and
seventy-five percent to the adjacent province.2 44 Nova Scotia with-
drew from the memorandum before it was implemented,2 45 and, in
1980, formally renewed its offshore claim by introducing legislation
entitled An Act Respecting Petroleum Resources.2 46 Negotiations
between Nova Scotia and Canada resumed in 1981, however, and
proclamation of the act was delayed.2 47
Two major developments affecting administration of the Canadian
offshore resources occurred in March 1982. First, the entry into
238. See Doucet, Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Agreement: One Year Later, 22
ALTA. L. REV. 132 (1984).
239. Newfoundland rejected the 1977 attempt at a political settlement and contin-
ued to press its offshore claims. See Harrison, Natural Resources and the Constitution:
Some Recent Developments and Their Implications for the Future Regulation of the
Resource Industry, 18 ALTA. L. REv. 1, 15 (1980).
240. Federal-Provincial Memorandum of Understanding in Respect of the Admin-
istration and Management of Mineral Resources Offshore of the Maritime Provinces,
Ottawa (Feb. 1, 1977). For a complete discussion of the 1977 memorandum, see Harri-
son, The Offshore Mineral Resources Agreement in the Maritime Provinces, 4 DALHOU-
SIE L.J. 245 (1980).
241. Harrison, supra note 240, at 246.
242. Id. at 249.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 246.
245. See Gault, Recent Developments in the Federal-Provincial Dispute Concern-
ing Jurisdiction Over Offshore Petroleum Resources, 21 ALTA. L. REV. 97, 106 (1983).
246. N.S. REV. STAT. ch. 12, § 7 (1980); see also Gault, supra note 245, at 106.
247. Id.
force of the Canada Oil and Gas Act248 (COGA) established a new
administrative regime for all "Canada Lands" which included off-
shore seabeds.249 Second, the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Re-
sources Agreement 250 (Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement) was con-
cluded. COGA sets forth the terms for exploration agreements51
and production licenses,252 defines basic and progressive royalties,253
and provides a mechanism for requiring the use of Canadian goods,
services, and employees for offshore projects.254 As part of the Can-
ada-Nova Scotia Agreement, Nova Scotia agreed to adopt COGA
and to employ the federal administrative structure, the Canada Oil
and Gas Lands Administration (COGLA), to help manage the adja-
cent shelf albeit with provincial participation.255
The Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement did not resolve the issue of
ownership of the offshore resources, but did make ownership irrele-
vant to offshore petroleum development. Because the agreement has
been implemented by mirror legislation at both levels of government,
a definitive court ruling on ownership will not change the adminis-
2581trative regime.
An integral part of the joint regime is the Canada-Nova Scotia
248. Ch, 81, 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 2655 [hereinafter cited as COGA].
249. Id. § 2(1).
250. Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Manage-
ment and Revenue Sharing, 2 (Mar. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Canada-Nova Scotia
Agreement]. This agreement has been implemented through mirror legislation at the fed-
eral and provincial levels. Subsequent cites to this agreement will refer to the federal
implementing legislation, the Canada-Nova Scotia Oil and Gas Agreement Act, ch. 29,
Can. Stat. 1983-1984 [hereinafter cited as Canada-Nova Scotia Act]. The Nova Scotia
legislation of the same title is found at N.S. REV. STAT. ch. 2 (1984).
251. COGA, supra note 248, §§ 9-16.
252. Id. §§ 17-25.
253. Id. §§ 40-41.
254. Id. § 11.
255. See I. GAULT, PETROLEUM OPERATIONS ON THE CANADIAN CONTINENTAL
MARGIN: THE LEGAL ISSUES IN A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 22 (1983). Even though New-
foundland proceeded through the courts and eventually lost its bid for offshore jurisdic-
tion, Reference re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfound-
land, 5 D.L.R. 4th 385 (1984), it recently concluded a political agreement concerning
offshore jurisdiction, the Atlantic Accord, which was signed on February 11, 1985. The
terms of the Atlantic Accord concerning control and revenue sharing are arguably more
favorable for the province than the Canada-Nova Scotia agreement. The Canada-Nova
Scotia Agreement did, at section 25, contain a "most favored nations clause" whereby
Nova Scotia had the option to replace its agreement with a more favorable federal-pro-
vincial agreement. This clause expired, however, on January 1, 1985. Although the At-
lantic Accord was not signed until February 11, 1985, it was based upon a June 14,
1984, Agreement in Principle. Nova Scotia's legal position is, therefore, unclear, but the
political posture of the two governments makes it likely that further negotiations will
follow.
256. See supra note 250. Article 1 of Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement, provides
that it is a "political instrument . . . [intended to] survive any decision of a court with
respect to ownership and jurisdiction . See Canada-Nova Scotia Act, supra note
250.
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Offshore Oil and Gas Board257 (CNS Board). The CNS Board, com-
posed of three federally appointed members and two members from
Nova Scotia, 258 makes decisions and recommendations to the Fed-
eral Minister of Energy, Mines, and Resources concerning develop-
ment and licensing. 219 Provincial members on the CNS Board are a
minority, however, and the Minister is not required to accept deci-
sions of the Board but may instead substitute his own decision.260 In
the event the Minister accepts the CNS Board's decision or substi-
tutes his own, the Nova Scotia members have the power to delay
implementation of certain "specified decisions," 261 thus allowing an
opportunity for further political negotiation.262
Although the implementing federal legislation (the Canada-Nova
Scotia Act) allows a series of delegations of authority to the CNS
Board and the province,2 63 ultimate control appears to be clearly es-
tablished at the federal level. The primary benefits of the agreement
to Nova Scotia are in the economic development and revenue-shar-
ing provisions. According to a formula based on the level of eco-
nomic development,264 the province may receive bonus payments,
proceeds from rental and license fees, and up to one hundred percent
of the revenues generated from basic and progressive incremental
royalties.265 In addition, Nova Scotia may apply its sales and income
taxes to the offshore region.266 Nova Scotians will also have priority
for jobs and industry participation, 67 and the province is entitled to
receive oil and gas produced from the Scotian shelf sufficient to
cover its present and future domestic needs.2 68
Although rigorous protection of the environment and the fishing
industry was included as an objective of the Canada-Nova Scotia
257. Canada-Nova Scotia Act, supra note 250, § 7.
258. Id.
259. Id. § 8.
260. Id. § 16(2).
261. Id. § 16(3). A "specified decision" includes decisions respecting calls for sub-
mission of proposals for exploration agreements, entering into and terms of exploration
agreements, approval of and terms of plans for Canadian participation, the granting of
and terms of production licenses, and authorization of systems for producing oil and gas.
Id. § 16(l).
262. See Doucet, supra note 238, at 135.
263. See Canada-Nova Scotia Act, supra note 250, §§ 23-24.
264. Id. §§ 64-65, 75-76.
265. See Gault, supra note 245, at 107; I. GAULT, supra note 255, at 64.
266. See Gault, supra note 245, at 107.
267. Canada-Nova Scotia Act, supra note 250, § 20.
268. Id. § 21.
Agreement,2 9 the Canada-Nova Scotia Act does not address this is-
sue specifically. COGA, the act specifically adopted for the adminis-
tration of the Scotian offshore, gives the Minister of Energy, Mines,
and Resources a great deal of discretion in the issuance and terms of
exploration agreements. 270 The Federal Minister will generally pub-
lish a notice calling for submission of proposals for an exploration
agreement, 271 but may enter into exploration agreements without no-
tice if in the public interest.27 2 The Minister may accept any propo-
sal, or none at all, and may take into account "any factors he consid-
ers appropriate in the public interest. 273 In addition, the Minister is
required to publish the terms and conditions thirty days before con-
cluding an unpublicized agreement. 7 In practice, however, COGA
creates a system whereby the Minister is given virtually total discre-
tion in defining the rights and obligations embodied in an exploration
agreement. This flexibility, although allowing the government ample
latitude to take into account environmental concerns, lacks proce-
dural safeguards for identifying and achieving objectives and assur-
ing even-handed application.
Section 23(1) of the Canada-Nova Scotia Act requires that the
Minister delegate to the CNS Board certain duties, including the
negotiation of exploration agreements. The call for proposals and the
negotiation of agreements are both identified "specified decisions, '275
subject to override by the Minister2 78 and delay by the Nova Scotian
members of the CNS Board.27
The holder of an exploration agreement is generally entitled to a
production license if certain conditions are met.278 A production li-
cense gives the holder the exclusive right to produce oil and gas on
269. Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement, supra note 250, art 8. The agreement re-
quires that offshore petroleum development plans meet both federal and provincial envi-
ronmental standards and that federal and provincial environmental and fisheries agencies
should review all applications for offshore exploration or production.
270. See generally Hunt, Management of Federal Petroleum Lands in Canada, in
MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES IN CANADA 121-39 (J. Saunders ed. 1986).
271. Canada-Nova Scotia Act, supra note 250, § 11.
272. COGA, supra note 248, § 12.
273. Id. § 14.
274. Id. § 12(2).
275. Canada-Nova Scotia Act, supra note 250, § 16(l)(a)-(b).
276. Id. § 16(2).
277. Id. § 16(3).
278. COGA, supra note 248, § 9. The primary condition is that the party must
demonstrate at least a 50% beneficial Canadian ownership interest. Id. § 19. In addition,
if the production license is sought for lands in which the party had no previous interest,
for example, lands adjacent to area subject to an exploration agreement, the party must
satisfy the Minister that a "commercial discovery extends to those Canadian lands." Id.
§ 18(3). A "commercial discovery" is defined as "a discovery of oil or gas that demon-
strates the existence of oil or gas reserves that, if a feasible means of delivery to market
existed, would justify the investment capital and effort to bring the discovery to produc-
tion." Id. § 2(1).
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the submerged land and confers title to the oil and gas produced.27 19
The Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act, 8 0 (OGPCA)
which was amended in connection with the enactment of COGA,
further provides that "any work or activity related to the exploration
for or the production of oil and gas" on the continental shelf requires
an operating license issued by the Minister of Energy, Mines, and
Resources.281 The Minister is given wide latitude in subjecting the
holder of an operating license to "such requirements as he deter-
mines '28 2 and is specifically authorized to require environmental pro-
grams or studies.283
The major amendments to the OGPCA were enacted as a result of
concern over spills of oil and other pollutants.28 4 The OGPCA now
prohibits any oil spills, 28 5 imposes a reporting requirement for all
spills,28s and establishes clean-up procedures and authorities.2 87 The
act also imposes strict liability upon operators for cleanup costs and
all actual loss or damage caused by oil spills2 8 or debris from ongo-
ing or abandoned operations. 89
A major characteristic of the petroleum management system for
the Scotian continental shelf is its uncertainty.290 In addition to the
uncertainty inherent in the degree of ministerial discretion granted
by COGA,29' there is also the issue of which law or regulatory
scheme applies. Many of the Minister's powers are delegated to the
CNS Board and may be granted to the Nova Scotia Minister of En-
ergy and Mines. 2  Furthermore, the implementing legislation at
both the federal and state levels provides that it will prevail over any
conflicting law,293 but fails to identify which other laws apply to the
279. Id. § 17.
280. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 0-4 (1970), amended by ch. 81, 1980-1983 Can. Stat.
2655, §§ 74-85.
281. COGA, supra note 248, § 3.1.
282. Id. § 3.2(l)(a).
283. Id. § 3.2(1)(b)(ii).
284. Id. § 19-19.3.
285. Id. § 19.1(1).
286. Id. § 19.1(2).
287. Id. § 19.1(3)-(9).
288. Id. § 19.2(1)(a).
289. Id. § 19.2(2)(a); see also id. § 19.(2) (for the definition of "debris").
290. For a general critique of legal problems associated with the petroleum man-
agement regime, see Hunt, supra note 270.
291. See, e.g., Doucet, supra note 238, at 136 (arguing that the degree of ministe-
rial discretion allowed by COGA makes it virtually impossible to certify title to land for
purposes of securing credit).
292. See Canada-Nova Scotia Act, supra note 250, §§ 23-24.
293. See id. § 3; Canada-Nova Scotia Oil and Gas Agreement Act, N.S. REV.
Nova Scotia offshore. Even among federal agencies, there is a great
deal of regulatory overlap.2 94 A new, and markedly different, fed-
eral-provincial agreement, the Atlantic Accord, now applies to man-
agement of the Newfoundland offshore. Rather than clarifying the
situation, however, the implementation of inconsistent offshore re-
gimes may create more confusion or, at least, instigate further Can-
ada-Nova Scotia negotiations. One commentator has described the
offshore petroleum management regime as "far from mature. 295
There is likely to be a great deal more uncertainty and change while
the regime "grows up."
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
Since the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969296 (NEPA), assessment of environmental impact has become a
routine part of the activities of United States federal agencies. The
Canadian government has also recognized the benefits of environ-
mental assessment to planning and decisionmaking, but has found
the "highly legalistic approach developed in the United States...
wanting. ' 29 7 The Canadian government, therefore, has taken a more
cautious and "flexible" approach to environmental assessment in an
attempt to avoid the pitfalls it perceived in the NEPA process: mas-
sive bureaucracy, inordinate delays, and lengthy and expensive law-
suits. 29 8 The result has been the evolution of similar systems, but
with some markedly different aspects. A direct comparison of the
elements of each country's system of environmental assessment pro-
vides the best approach for analysis.
Unlike the statutorily mandated environmental assessment of
NEPA,2 9 Canada's federal Environmental Assessment and Review
Process30 (EARP) is completely nonstatutory. EARP was instituted
by a Cabinet policy decision on December 20, 1973, and amended in
1977. Procedures were developed by the Interdepartmental Commit-
tee on the Environment to implement the cabinet decisions and were
published as guides in 1975, 1977, and 1979.301 Review and recom-
mendations by the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Of-
STAT. ch. 2, § 3 (1984).
294. See Hunt, supra note 270, at 136.
295. Id. at 139.
296. NEPA, supra note 188.
297. D. EMOND, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT LAW IN CANADA 227 (1978) (quot-
ing Jack Davis, Minister of Environment).
298. See id.; see also 1 R. FRANSON & A. Lucus, CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW § 9.2.1 (1976).
299. NEPA, supra note 188, § 4332(A)-(C).
300. The process was instituted by a federal cabinet decision of December 20,
1973.
301. See I R. FRANSON & A. Lucus, supra note 298, § 9.2.3.
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fice °2 (FEARO) led to the issuance of the June 1984 Environmental
Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order °3 (EARP Guide-
lines) as an Order-in-Council, replacing former cabinet decisions.30'
Although EARP clearly lacks the legal force of NEPA, a 1979
amendment to the Government Organization Act35 clarified the au-
thority of the Minister of Environment to establish environmental
assessment procedures which impinge on activities and authorities of
other federal agencies. 306 In addition, the 1984 cabinet decision em-
phasized that although the new EARP order contains only "guide-
lines," affected government agencies are to consider them
mandatory.307
The Environmental Impact Statement 08 (EIS) is the primary
planning and decisionmaking tool required under both the Canadian
and United States systems of environmental assessment. In analyz-
ing these systems, the first issues to consider are who is affected by
the EIS requirement and under what circumstances. NEPA provides
that an EIS must be prepared for "proposals for . . . major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment." 309 The meaning of virtually every word of this phrase has
been litigated many times to flesh out its skeletal requirements. For
instance, federal actions are judged primarily by the degree of fed-
eral agency participation in the activity. Of course, a federal
agency's proposed activity which may degrade the environment trig-
gers the EIS requirement, but a federal agency need not initiate nor
even directly participate in a project to deem it a federal action. If
the action is eligible for federal funding or requires federal approval
or permitting, the action will be federal if the federal participation is
302. See R. Robinson, The Federal Role in Environmental Assessment 2-3 (Apr.
18, 1985) (unpublished paper presented at the Second Banff Conference on Natural Re-
sources Law).
303. P.C. 1984-2132, (June 21, 1984), reprinted in Can. Gaz., pt. II, at 1 (July 11,
1984) [hereinafter cited as EARP Guidelines].
304. FED. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT REVIEW OFFICE. REGISTER OF PANEL PROJECTS,
No. 22, at I (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter cited as FEARO].
305. Ch. 13, 1978-1979 Can. Stat., § 14.
306. See 1 R. FRANSON & A. Lucus, supra note 298, § 9.2.3; see also D. EMOND,
supra note 297, at 271. The text suggests that the early success and failure of EARP
were directly related to the extent that other departments were willing to recognize the
legitimacy of environmental assessment and were prepared to give up control of activities
to a relatively junior department in what the author terms a "not very subtle power
change." D. EMOND, supra note 297, at 271.
307. See R. Robinson, supra note 302, at 3.
308. See NEPA, supra note 188, § 4332(2)(C); EARP Guidelines, supra note
303, §§ 30-31.
309. NEPA, supra note 188, § 4332(2)(c).
sufficiently extensive or enables the activity to go forward.310 In addi-
tion, the promulgation of rules and regulations by a federal agency is
a federal action, even when subsequent EISs may be required for
individual actions taken to implement the rule or regulation.311
Clearly, outer continental shelf lease plans, leasing activities, and
plan approvals, as well as the adoption of fisheries management
plans and regulations, are federal actions.
One commentator has noted that "[o]ne of the most difficult and
persistent problems with EARP is knowing who and what is subject
to the Process." 312 The new EARP Guidelines attempt to clarify the
situation by providing that EARP applies to any proposal
(a) that is to be undertaken directly by an initiating department;
(b) that may have an environmental effect on an area of federal
responsibility;
(c) for which the Government of Canada makes a financial commitment; or(d) that is located on lands, including the offshore that are administered by
the Government of Canada.313
The former procedures were applicable to "federal projects, pro-
grams, and activities. 31 Federal projects were defined in terms of
federal funds, lands, or initiatives. 1 5 Federal programs and activi-
ties, however, were not defined although they apparently were not
intended to include regulatory activities. EARP was not directly ap-
plicable to regulatory agencies which were merely "invited" to par-
ticipate in the process.310 The new guidelines are more closely tied to
the role of environmental assessment in the decisionmaking process,
rather than to the nature of the project or activity.317 Regulatory
bodies that have "a regulatory function in respect of a proposal" 31 8
are now subject to EARP where there is no legal impediment or
duplication.31 9
One advantage of the flexibility of the Canadian process is that
cooperative environmental assessments between jurisdictions can be
instituted to avoid duplication, reduce costs, and expedite decision-
310. See generally D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 8.15-8.28
(1984).
311. See, e.g., American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmide, 485 F. Supp. 811
(D.D.C. 1980).
312. D. EMOND, supra note 297, at 271.
313. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 6.
314. See 1 R. FRANSON & A. Lucus, supra note 298, § 9.2.3.
315. Id.
316. See CANADIAN COUNCIL OF RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MINISTERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN CANADA: 1983 SUMMARY OF CURRENT PRACTICE 9 (W.
Couch ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as CURRENT PRACTICE].
317. See EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, §§ 2-3.
318. A "proposal" is defined as "any initiative, undertaking or activity for which
the Government of Canada has a decision making responsibility." Id. § 2.
319. Id. § 8.
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making.320 The EARP Guidelines authorize the Federal Environ-
ment Assessment Review Office (FEARO), which administers
EARP for the Minister of Environment, to negotiate arrangements
with provinces for joint environmental review procedures. 2 1 Current
practice relates the degree of federal or provincial participation on
joint review panels to the extent to which major decisions affecting
the project are made at each level.3 22 Pursuant to the Canada-Nova
Scotia Agreement,3 23 a joint environmental review board was ap-
pointed for the Venture Offshore Gas Development. 24
Both the United States and Canadian procedures emphasize envi-
ronmental assessment procedures as a planning tool. This requires
that environmental assessment be carried out in the earliest stages of
proposal development. The United States Supreme Court, however,
has interpreted NEPA to require an EIS only at the point a proposal
is actually made.3 25 The Court held that "the contemplation of a
project and the accompanying study thereof do not necessarily result
in a proposal for major federal action." 32 16 This does not mean that
EISs are routinely prepared as post hoc rationalizations for deci-
sions, but rather that courts will not second guess agencies in deter-
mining when an EIS should be prepared.
The earliest Canadian reviews under EARP were particularly un-
successful as planning tools. EARP was applied to the Point Lepreau
Nuclear Power Station and the Wreck Cove Hydro Electric Power
Project only after the decision to proceed had already been made. 27
The current EARP Guidelines emphasize that the EARP is a plan-
ning tool, and not a regulatory process.3 28 Although the goal of the
Canadian system is to initiate the process at the conceptual stages of
proposal development, in practice the review process for offshore oil
320. R. Robinson, supra note 302, at 4.
321. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 35(c).
322. See R. Robinson, supra note 302, at 4.
323. See Canada-Nova Scotia Act, supra note 250, art. 8(b).
324. R. Robinson, supra note 302, at 6.
325. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
326. Id. at 406.
327. See D. EMOND, supra note 297, at 271.
328. Raymond Robinson, the Executive Director of FEARO, emphasizes that the
early initiation of EARP in cases that will require subsequent regulatory review does not
necessarily result in a duplication of efforts. EARP findings can be incorporated into the
design of projects before application, thus improving the project and reducing the work-
load of regulatory agencies. The two processes can complement each other if the regula-
tory agency includes the mitigatory measures recommended by the EARP report as con-
ditions of the permit or certificate it may issue and has authority to enforce. See R.
Robinson, supra note 302, at 22-23.
development starts at a much later stage than in the United States.
Initial departmental decisions that leasing and exploration have no
significant effect on the environment have meant that only proposals
for production are referred for public review. 329 In addition, no fish-
eries management proposals have been referred for review.330
The procedures of either country apply only if the potential envi-
ronmental effects of a proposal are "significant." 331 Although there
is no definition of the term in either NEPA or the EARP Guide-
lines, 332 one can infer simply from the number of projects subject to
environmental review under each country's procedures that the
threshold for significance may be much higher in the Canadian pro-
cess. 333 For example, during the first nine years of EARP's applica-
tion (1974 through 1982), review panel reports on only twenty-one
projects were issued.334 In comparison, during the first nine years of
NEPA (1970 through 1978), 9521 draft and final EISs were filed in
the United States.335
A unique feature of the Canadian review process is that the effects
of a proposed project are deemed significant if the public perceives
them to be. 336 More precisely, the EARP guidelines provide that,
notwithstanding a determination by a department that the environ-
mental effects of a project are minimal or mitigable, the proposal
should be submitted for review if "public concern . . . is such that
329. Only exploration plans for oil exploration in particularly sensitive Arctic areas
have been referred for application of EARP. Telephone interview with Mr. Bob Con-
nelly, Federal Office on Environmental Assessment Review (Aug. 12, 1985).
330. Id.
331. See NEPA, supra note 188, § 4332(2)(C); see also EARP Guidelines, supra
note 303, § 12(e).
332. United States agencies have developed procedures to implement NEPA in-
cluding lists of activities which generally do or do not require an EIS. See, e.g., NA-
TIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969, Directive 02-10 (revised June 18,
1980). The EARP Guidelines provide that for purposes of initial screening, departments
shall develop, in cooperation with FEARO, lists of activities automatically excluded from
or referred for environmental review. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, at 11.
333. This inference may indeed be overly simple and not as valid as statistics seem
to suggest. The division of authorities and activities between Canadian federal and pro-
vincial governments differs greatly from the situation in the United States. Many envi-
ronmental assessment reviews are carried out at the provincial level. Increasingly, more
projects are becoming subject to EARP. Only six panel reports were issued between 1973
and 1978 as compared to eighteen during the next five year period. FEARO, supra note
304, at 13. Emond notes that "as the Process becomes better known, it will become
difficult for anything but the most innocuous project to slip by without an assessment."
D. EMOND, supra note 297, at 272.
334. FEARO, supra note 304, at 13.
335. See N. ORLOEF & G. BROOK, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT-CASES AND MATERIALS 53-54 (1980). One commentator estimates that 30,000
EISs per year are now being filed by United States agencies. See T. SCHOENBAUM, ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY LAW 114 (1982).
336. See I R. FRANSON & A. LUCUS, supra note 298, § 9.2.3.
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public review is desirable. 33
7
The initial screening of proposals and self-assessment by govern-
ment agencies are similar in both countries. Unless significant envi-
ronmental effects are patent, United States agencies normally pre-
pare an environmental assessment as a decision document.3 a8
Canadian initiating departments 339 must determine whether the en-
vironmental effects of a proposal are: (1) insignificant or mitigable
with known technology; (2) unknown and thus requiring further
study and subsequent rescreening or reassessment; (3) unacceptable,
in which case the proposal must be modified or abandoned; or (4)
potentially significant.340
Both countries' procedures provide for public review at this initial
stage.34' In the Canadian process, however, there is no provision for
judicialor administrative review, nor is there standing to challenge a
department's finding of no significant impact. 342 The self-assessment
decision is the sole basis for initiating the assessment and review pro-
cedure. Since there is no legal duty, it is doubtful that legal proceed-
ings could be brought to require the application of EARP.343
Once the determination is made that potential environmental ef-
fects are significant, the procedures followed in the two countries are
quite different. In the United States, the agency proceeds with the
preparation of the EIS by first conducting a scoping process to iden-
tify and determine the range of issues to be addressed by the EIS.3 44
Public comment is invited through the publication of a notice of in-
337. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 13; cf. Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d
823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that public controversy alone is insufficient to make an
action significant enough to require an EIS).
338. See Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1981).
339. EARP Guidelines define an "initiating department" as "any department that
is ... the decision making authority for a proposal." EARP Guidelines, supra note 303,
§ 2. Initiating departments cannot delegate authority for making initial screenings. Id. §
10(2).
340. Id. § 12.
341. When a United States agency issues a negative declaration or finding of no
significant impact for a project that is similar to one that generally requires an EIS or a
project of first impression, the agency must allow a 30 day public review period before
beginning or approving the project. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1981). Canadian depart-
ments are required to ensure that the public has "access to the information on and the
opportunity to respond to the proposal .. " EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 15.
342. A decision by an agency not to prepare an EIS, however, is a final agency
action subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1972).
343. See 1 R. FRANSON & A. Lucus, supra note 298, § 9.2.3.
344. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1984).
tent to prepare an EIS.3 5 A draft EIS is then prepared according to
the parameters identified by the scoping process346 and the general
guidelines promulgated by the Council, on Environmental Quality.3 47
The draft EIS is circulated for comment 348 and, when considered
"appropriate," public hearings are held. 349 The final EIS is prepared
in response to input from the comment process and public
hearings.35
When an initiating agency in Canada determines that the poten-
tial environmental effect of a proposal is significant or that public
concern makes review desirable, the agency must refer the proposal
to the Minister of Environment for review by an independent
panel.351 The Environmental Assessment Panel (Panel) generally
consists of five to seven members,3 52 and is appointed by the Minister
of Environment and chaired by the Executive Director of FEARO or
his delegate.35 3 A different panel is usually appointed for each public
review. The scope of public review for the proposal is defined in the
terms of reference issued to the Panel by the Minister of Environ-
ment.3 5 4 A major function of the Panel is to develop EIS guidelines
for each proposal.3 55 Public comment may be solicited on draft
guidelines, and public meetings may be held before the EIS guide-
lines are finalized and submitted to the initiating department.3 58
In the Canadian process, the EIS guidelines are submitted to the
initiating department, but it is the responsibility of the proponent to
345. Id.
346. Id. § 1502.9(a).
347. See id. § 1500.
348. Id. § 1502.9.
349. Id. § 1502.6.
350. Id. § 1502.9.
351. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 20.
352. See CURRENT PRACTICE, supra note 316, at 9.
353. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, 9§ 21-23.
354. Id. § 26.
355. Id. § 30. FEARO has issued general EIS guidelines for projects such as hy-
droelectric dams and nuclear power facilities, but they are only used as a basis for devel-
oping specific proposal guidelines. I R. FRANSON & A. Lucus, supra note 298, § 9.2.3.
356. See Duinker & Beanlands, The Characteristics and Role of Scientific Infor-
mation in the Canadian Environmental Assessment and Review Process, Working Paper
11, at 3 (1984) (to be published in ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING IN A TRANS-
BOUNDARY REGION: FUNDY TIDAL POWER AND THE NEW ENGLAND COAST (A. Rieser
& J. Spiller eds.)). This study found EISs to be "often severely deficient in information,"
but identified the Panels to be as much at fault as the preparers of the EIS because the
Panel submitted only broadly drawn, nonspecific guidelines. Duinker & Beanlands,
Working Paper 11, at 8. The Executive Director of FEARO has stated that particular
attention is now being given to improving EIS guidelines. Early meetings are being used
to "scope" the parameters of review. Subsequent public meetings may be held to receive
comment on draft guidelines. The goal is for the guidelines to evolve from a list of "de-
tailed questions with prescribed methodology" to a focused list of "factors of value" to be
examined. See R. Robinson, supra note 302, at 19-20.
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prepare the EIS and implement a public information program.357 In
the case of an environmental review of offshore oil production, for
example, the oil company, rather than the Canada Oil and Gas
Lands Administration, 358 prepares the EIS. A leading United States
case, Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commis-
sion,3 59 held that private applicants cannot be responsible for the
preparation of the necessary EIS.360 Subsequent cases 11 and regula-
tions,382 however, have allowed applicants to submit environmental
information and participate in studies, so long as the federal agency
determines the types of information required and independently eval-
uates the information.38 3 If an EARP Panel conscientiously designs
the EIS guidelines and assesses the adequacy of the information sub-
mitted in the EIS, the differences in the two systems may be more
form than substance.
The Canadian EIS is submitted to the Panel which determines
through review and public comment the sufficiency of the EIS. Addi-
tional information may be sought by issuing a deficiency statement
to the initiating department and proponent.36 After deficiencies in
the EIS are corrected, formal public hearings are held on the propo-
sal and the EIS. Hearings are nonjudicial and informal; the Panel
may question, but not subpoena, witnesses.3 65 At least one commen-
tator has criticized the Panel for making decisions based on informa-
tion received after the public hearings.366 EARP guidelines now spe-
cifically provide that the public should have access to, as well as time
to examine and comment on, information before a public hearing.3 67
In addition, the Panel is arguably subject to a judicially reviewable
duty of procedural fairness.368
A report of the Panel's conclusions and recommendations is
357. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 34(a), (c). The "proponent" is the or-
ganization or department actually undertaking the project. Id. § 2.
358. The Canada Oil and Gas Lands Administration is the administrative office
serving the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources and the Canada-Nova Scotia Re-
view Board.
359. 455 F.2d 412 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
360. Id. at 420-21.
361. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 994 (1975).
362. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5 (1984),
363. See generally D. MANDELKER, supra note 310, § 7.04.
364. See Duinker & Beanlands, supra note 356, at 4.
365. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 27(1), (3).
366. D. EMOND, supra note 297, at 230.
367. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 29.
368. See 1 R. FRANSON & A. Lucus, supra note 298, § 9.2.3.
presented to the Minister of Environment and the minister of the
initiating department. 6 It is the responsibility of the ministers to
make the report available to the public,370 and to ensure that any
decisions made by the appropriate ministers as a result of the Panel's
conclusions and recommendations are incorporated into the design,
construction, and operation of the proposed project.3 1 It must be
emphasized, however, that the Panel report is advisory; a department
has no legal obligation to implement a Panel's recommendations. In
this case, again, the difference in the United States and Canadian
procedures may be one of form rather than substance. Although
NEPA creates the legal requirement that environmental impact and
alternative actions in agency decisionmaking must be considered,3 72
so long as an agency conforms to the procedural requirements of
NEPA and considers the environmental consequences of its action,
the agency is not legally bound by environmental factors.3a 3 EARP
guidelines appear to reflect United States jurisprudence by providing
that the self-assessment process is intended to "ensure that the envi-
ronmental implications of all proposals .. .are fully considered
"374
Must the environmental assessment process consider potential
transboundary effects of a proposal? EARP guidelines specifically
state that a department's self-assessment process should include "the
potential environmental effects of the proposal and the social effects
directly related to those environmental effects, including any effects
that are external to Canadian territory ... .,,75
Whether NEPA applies to extraterritorial environmental impacts
is much more questionable and controversial.3 76 Although no provi-
sion in NEPA specifically indicates whether an agency must consider
the extraterritorial environmental impacts of its activities, one para-
graph of NEPA does address international environmental
responsibility:
369. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 31.
370. Id. § 31(2).
371. Id. § 33(l)(d).
372. NEPA, supra note 188, § 4332(2)(C).
373. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
374. EARP Guidelines, supra note 303, § 3 (emphasis added).
375. Id. § 4(l)(a) (emphasis added).
376. Objections to extraterritorial application of NEPA have ranged from financial
issues (costs greatly outweigh the benefits) to foreign policy issues (interference with the
sovereignty of other countries). See generally Almond, The Extraterritorial Reach of
United States Regulatory Authority Over the Environmental Impacts of Its Activities,
44 ALB. L. REv. 739 (1980); Comment, Federal Agency Responsibility to Assess Extra-
territorial Environmental Impacts, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 425 (1979); Note, The Scope of
the National Environmental Policy Act: Should the 102(2)(C) Impact Statement Provi-
sion be Applicable to a Federal Agency's Activities Having Environmental Conse-
quences Within Another Sovereign's Jurisdiction?, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 317
(1978).
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[All] agencies of the Federal Government shall-recognize the worldwide
and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent
with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to
initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international co-
operation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of man-
kind's world environment.17
The legislative history does not conclusively indicate, however,
whether this section was intended to extend the effect of NEPA ex-
traterritorially, or merely to authorize agency participation in inter-
national cooperative programs .3 7  Court decisions in which the issue
was raised have been inconclusive, 79 and draft regulations by the
Council on Environmental Quality extending NEPA to extraterrito-
rial actions were withdrawn when businesses and several federal
agencies objected. 8 0 President Carter's 1979 Executive Order on the
Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions38' was is-
sued in an effort to settle the controversy. Unfortunately, it left un-
resolved the question of whether NEPA extended to direct impacts
on foreign countries. The order applies to "major federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the environment of the global commons." ' 2 Al-
though the global commons is generally understood to include the
oceans, exclusive jurisdictional zones such as continental shelves and
fisheries zones would certainly be considered "the environment[s] of
... foreign nations[s]" even though foreign nations are generally
excluded from application of the order's EIS requirement.38 3 The
question of whether NEPA mandates consideration of the extraterri-
torial environmental impacts on Canada of fisheries management or
petroleum production, therefore, remains unclear.
377. NEPA, supra note 188, § 4332(2)(F).
378. See generally Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental
Impact Statement Requirement, 74 MICH. L. REV. 349, 365-71 (1975) (discussion of the
legislative history of this section of the NEPA).
379. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. United
States Dep't of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978); Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F.
Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973).
380. CEQ MEMORANDUM TO HEADS OF AGENCIES: APPLICATION OF THE NA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT TO FEDERAL ACTIvITIES ABROAD, reprinted in 8
ENV'T REP. 1493 (1978).
381. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979).
382. Id. § 2-3(a).
383. The Executive Order applies to environmental impacts in a foreign nation
only if the project or product involves a toxic substance which creates a serious public
health risk or involves radioactive substances. Id. §§ 2-3(c)(1), (2).
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
One commentator has noted that the Georges Bank-Gulf of Maine
boundary hardly creates a unique situation. The new maritime
boundary merely adds about 250 nautical miles to the approximately
5,525 statute miles of boundary already shared by the two coun-
tries.384 On the other hand, this formerly high seas area is quite dif-
ferent from continental frontier areas, because international law has
not yet evolved to the point of developing with certainty the right
and obligations of states in relationship to the fisheries and exclusive
economic zones. Political, economic, and social issues peculiar to the
region continue to pervade United States-Canadian relations and im-
pede progress toward resolution of environmental problems.
The two countries are at a point that has been described as a "bi-
lateral threshold." '85 United States and Canadian negotiators and
decisionmakers are faced squarely with the kind of resource alloca-
tion and social engineering issues that the ICJ has avoided by basing
delimitation of offshore areas on geometric methods related to the
coastline.36 Domestic politics, 38 7 federalism, and nationalism further
complicate attempts at objective resoluton of the inherently complex
problems.
In addition to the domestic impediments to reasoned solutions,
certain behavioral characteristics of the United States and Canada
have historically affected the relations of the two countries and will
also shape future negotiations. First, the United States appears to
favor litigation as a dispute resolution mechanism, while Canada
clearly prefers negotiation. The history of federal-state and federal-
384. Schneider, supra note 73, at 575.
385. McDorman, Saunders & VanderZwaag, supra note 30, at 106.
386. The Special Chamber found that a delimitation according to equitable crite-
ria primarily involved principles related to geographic features, and that other factors
come into account only to assure an equitable result. See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246.
In the delimitation of the Libya-Tunisia continental shelf, the ICJ went even further in
rejecting economic and social factors, such as a country's relative poverty or wealth, as
factors in a delimitation of the continental shelf. The ICJ stated that "these economic
considerations cannot be taken into account .... They are virtually extraneous factors
since they are variables which unpredictable national fortune or calamity ... might at
any time cause to tilt the scale one way or the other." Concerning the Continental Shelf
(Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 64-65, paras. 106-07 (Judgment of
Feb. 24), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 225 (1982).
387. Domestic politics, rather than the inability of the governments involved to
reach a negotiated conclusion, can probably be cited as the primary reason for submit-
ting the boundary issue to the ICJ. Fisheries interests exert a disproportionate amount of
influence on the governmental affairs of both the United States and Canada compared to
the relatively small contribution of fisheries to the gross national product of the countries.
See W. WILLOUGHBY, THE JOINT ORGANIZATION OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
65 (1970). Willoughby suggests that the influence of fishing interests is due to "the con-
centration of ... voting strength in several coastal regions, . . . increasing recognition
of the importance of fish as food. . . "and "the traditional link of fishing with the naval
and commercial life of the nation." Id.
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provincial relations in regard to the ownership and exploitation of
the continental shelf3 88 and each country's experience with environ-
mental assessment provide even better examples of these preferences
than the Georges Bank boundary dispute.389 Second, Canada prefers
strong treaty obligations and enforceable management authority in a
supranational organization, rather than agreements on general prin-
ciples with implementation left to future ad hoc negotiations. Both
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909,390 establishing the Interna-
tional Joint Commission, 91 and the failed East Coast Fisheries
Agreement 92 reflect this preference. 393 Finally, the United States'
law and administrative structure incorporate a much greater degree
of formal public participation than Canada's. Although this is pri-
marily a result of the United States' larger and more organized citi-
zen's environmental movement, it may also be partly attributable to
differences in political accountability in the two countries.
McDorman, Saunders, and VanderZwaag have suggested possible
management steps for the Georges Bank region, which include har-
monizing national legislation governing offshore resources, and pro-
viding each nation's citizens equal access to the courts and adminis-
388. See supra text accompanying notes 164-295.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 296-383; see also J. CARROLL, ENVIRON-
MENTAL DIPLOMACY: AN EXAMINATION AND A PROSPECTIVE OF CANADIAN-U.S. ENVI-
RONMENTAL RELATIONS 282-84 (1983). Carroll provides the two countries' approaches to
pollution control as examples of their behavioral preferences. The United States' "stan-
dards [are] strict and were designed to accommodate expensive and inevitable litigation."
Id. at 282. Canada chose "more realistic air and water quality objectives" and "nego-
tiat[es] with the proposed polluter to determine what is an appropriate control objective
for a given area, and then how much pollutant emission is reasonably allowable in order
to reach or preserve this objective." Id. at 283.
390. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada,
Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter
cited as Boundary Waters Treaty].
391. Id. art. 7.
392. Fisheries Agreement, supra note 61.
393. Canada perhaps perceives the United States as being in a stronger bargaining
position and, therefore, as having an advantage if disputes are settled on a case by case
basis. In addition, it may be that Canada finds the United States' political system too
unpredictable to rely upon for negotiated resource allocation or dispute settlement on an
ad hoc basis. In either case, it would seem that the words of George Gibbons, one of the
original negotiators of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, are equally appropriate today:
There is only one way in which we will get fair play, and avoid a conflict with
[the United States], and that is by a permanent joint commission which will
play the game fairly, and whose conclusions will be so justified by public opin-
ion, even in the United States, as to compel their acceptance.
See Note, A Primer on the Boundary Waters Treaty and the International Joint Com-
mission, 51 N.D.L. REV. 493, 496 n.31 (1974), (quoting Gibbons, Sir George Gibbons
and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 34 CAN. HIsT. REV., No. 2, at 127 (1953)).
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trative forums. 394 This overview of the legal regimes for marine
resource management and environmental assessment in the two
countries identifies some of the impediments to these alternatives.
Even in areas of clear federal supremacy, accomodation of state and
provincial interests in management decisionmaking would make at-
tempts to harmonize laws legally complicated and politically sensi-
tive. Canada has consistently rejected the United States' rigid, litiga-
tion-oriented system of management, while environmental groups in
the Untied States would be loathe to surrender any of the procedural
safeguards which they have fought to implement. The flexibility
which is the hallmark of the Canadian management systems would,
arguably, make it easier for the Canadian system, rather than the
United States regime, to adjust to a harmonization of the two sys-
tems. Unfortunately, the adoption of a structured, United States-
type regime with a high degree of public participation tends to fur-
ther emphasize local and domestic, but not international, concerns.
The harmonization of laws and authorities dealing with environ-
mental assessment 'could be more useful than the harmonization of
resource management regimes. The requirement that transnational
environmental impacts be considered by both countries could be
complemented by requiring joint environmental assessments for ac-
tivities in frontier regions or for activities that affect shared
resources.
Without harmonization, it is unlikely that equal access to the
courts and administrative forums will contribute significantly to the
improvement of resource management in the region. Presently, Ca-
nadian citizens have much greater access to the United States courts
to redress environmental injuries than United States citizens have to
Canadian courts.3 95 Although it would seem equitable to provide
United States citizens an equal opportunity in Canada to be compen-
sated for individual environmental damages, this measure would do
very little to further general resource management objectives. In ad-
dition, the access of Canadian citizens to their own courts for review
of resource management or environmental assessment decisions is so
394. See McDorman, Saunders & VanderZwaag, supra note 30, at 106. The au-
thors also suggest as possible management steps establishing a transboundary pollution
compensation scheme, referring questions to the International Joint Commission, and
creating new single purpose or multifunctional institutions to manage or advise upon
activities in the region. Id. at 106.
395. See Arbitlit, The Plight of American Citizens Injured by Transboundary
River Pollution, 8 EcOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1979). In an action by a United States citizen for
damages to property or other interests in the United States, a Canadian court would hold
that it had no jurisdiction in any case involving injury to foreign land. Id. at 342. In
addition, because Canadian courts will only enforce foreign judgments if jurisdiction in
the original case conformed with a form of jurisdiction exercised in Canada, a judgment
in the United States against a Canadian polluter may be unenforceable if the party has
no assets in the United States. Id. at 345-46.
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limited"" that equal access for United States' citizens would be vir-
tually meaningless.
As management prescriptions, harmonization of laws and equal
access to the courts only seem to treat the symptoms rather than the
disease. These types of solutions perpetuate the current system of ad
hoc responses and temporary accomodations that is potentially disas-
terous not only to resources and the environment, but to bilateral
relations as well.3 9 7 Carroll warns that environmental problems pre-
sent a greater threat to Canadian-United States relations than "any
other difficulties experienced in recent history."9 8 Furthermore, a new
order-a comprehensive approach to all transboundary issues-is
necessary to preserve the friendly and cooperative relationship be-
tween the United States and Canada.399
In the Georges Bank region, there are several comprehensive man-
agement approaches that could be implemented. In the case of fish-
eries management, resolution of the boundary may lead to the resur-
rection of a modified version of the East Coast Fisheries
Agreement 400 or a similarly structured joint management scheme.
Although the original agreement met with opposition because it
vested much of the power of the regional fishery management coun-
cil with a supranational commission, the major obstacle in the
United States was objection to the fixed percentages of catch allo-
cated by the agreement to the two countries' fishermen.4 01 Either due
to a belief that the United States' position would prevail in the case,
or because negotiation over fisheries allocations without an estab-
lished boundary created a kind of "blind man's bluff," United States
fishermen strongly opposed the allocations and the agreement. The
breakdown of the treaty should not, however, be attributed solely to
narrow-minded self interest on the part of New England fishermen;
when the circumstances provided the fishermen with no yardstick to
measure what was "fair," the only guideline available was to con-
sider what position was potentially more economically advantageous.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
397. See Carroll & Mack, On Living Together in North America: Canada, the
United States and International Relation, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 35, 36 (1982).
See also J. CARROLL, supra note 389, at 278-79.
398. See Carroll & Mack, supra note 397, at 36.
399. See id. at 41-40; J. CARROLL, supra note 389, at 279-305.
400. Fisheries Agreement, supra note 61. See also supra text accompanying notes
61-67.
401. Ironically, United States fishermen claimed that the proposed arrangement
lacked the flexibility to deal with changing stocks and national fishing patterns. See Mar-
itime Boundary Settlement Hearings, supra note 68.
Now that each country's fishing zone has been identified by the ICJ
Chamber, what is being gained and lost through negotiation of allo-
cations will become clearer, and the results may be more
acceptable.40 2
The complexity of fisheries management most likely requires that
it be the subject of an independent management regime. But even
presuming that a joint management scheme can again be negotiated
and, more importantly, implemented, the regime would not address
the problems associated with other uses in the region. Conflicts be-
tween oil development, navigation, tidal power development, and
fisheries are only a partial list of the issues not addressed by a fishery
management program. Likewise, other single purpose international
institutions, focusing perhaps on oil and gas development or transna-
tional pollution, could only deal comprehensively with their respec-
tive subjects.
Multi-use conflicts could be dealt with as they arise. A better and
less confrontational approach, however, is to refer these issues to an
established international commission. The commission's scope of
power might range from actual management of the region, to an ad-
visory group on policy, to merely that of a fact-finding agency. Ide-
ally, such a commission would have the authority to plan and estab-
lish policy and resource management objectives for the region.
Realistically, however, neither country is likely to agree to such a
delegation of power to a supranational commission.4 0 3 At the other
end of the spectrum, the merits of a mere international fact-finding
agency should not be discounted.
Although clearly not a total solution, it has been suggested that
common agreement on facts "constitutes two-thirds of the battle to
settle transboundary disputes. ' '40 4 Furthermore, independent fact-
finding, divorced from politics, nationalism, and emotion, is an
achievable goal and provides an objective basis for resolution of ideo-
logical differences. Finally, considering the current state of relations
between the two countries, joint fact-finding seems to be the most
realistic starting point for dealing with the plethora of transnational
environmental problems.
402. Problems in a new negotiation of allocations will still exist, however, because
east coast fishermen have no unity of interests--for example, the priorities of nearshore
fishermen differ from those of offshore fishermen; those of groundfish fishermen differ
from those of scallopers.
403. Many commentators agree that the creation of new binational resource man-
agement agencies is unlikely under the current state of Canadian-United States relations.
See, e.g., Scott, Fisheries, Pollution, and Canadian-American Transnational Relations,
28 INT'L ORc. 847 (1974); Cohen, Canada and the United States: Dispute Settlement
and the International Joint Commission - Can This Experience be Applied to Law of
the Sea Issues?, 8 CAS8 W. Ras. J. INT'L L. 69, 79 (1976).
404. J. CARROLL, supra note 389, at 280.
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It is primarily in the context of joint fact-finding that recommen-
dations to expand the role of the International Joint Commission
have emerged.40 5 The International Joint Commision (Commission)
is a unique binational commission created by the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty, with the power to make binding orders408 in "all
cases involving the use or obstruction or diversion" 40 7 of boundary
waters. 408 Of more relevance to the Georges Bank conflicts is the
Commission's broad authority to investigate "any other questions or
matters of difference arising between [the countries] involving the
rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to
the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier . . . [as]
shall be referred from time to time. .... ",409 Although either party
can initiate a reference, 10 the fact that both parties in practice have
agreed to the terms of the reference411 has contributed to the use of
the Commission and acceptability of its findings and recommenda-
tions. Since the mid-1950s, the Commission's investigative role has
become its primary and most successful function.412 The Commis-
sion's perspective over the years has evolved from water use and di-
version, to related land use issues, to water quality problems, and
even to transboundary air pollution. Yet the Commission has clearly
not been used to its full potential.413 Use of the Commission for joint
405. See, e.g., id.; McDorman, Saunders & VanderZwaag, supra note 30, at 106;
Cohen, The International Joint Commission: United States-Canada, 68 PRoc. AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 236, 238 (1974); Cohen, supra note 403, at 80.
406. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 390, arts. 7 & 8. The Commission is
composed of six commissioners, three from each country.
407. Id. art. 8.
408. The Preliminary Article of the Treaty defines boundary waters as
the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connect-
ing waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the international boundary
between the Untied States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including all
bays, arms and inlets thereof, but not including tributary waters which in their
natural channels would flow into such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or waters
flowing from such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or the waters of rivers flowing
across the boundary.
Id.
409. Id. art. 9 (emphasis added).
410. Id.
411. See Cohen, supra note 403, at 75 n.26.
412. See generally Note, supra note 393, at 504.
413. The investigative authority of the Commission is dependent upon the refer-
ence of an issue to it by one or both of the countries. Since the Commission cannot
initiate such investigations, many questions are never brought to it, or are referred at a
point at which the determinations cannot be effectively used for planning. A totally un-
used provision of the Boundary Waters Treaty is Article 10, which provides that the
parties can refer "[a]ny questions or matters of difference" to the Commission "for deci-
sion." Unlike the investigative authority of the Commission, this decisionmaking author-
fact-finding concerning Georges Bank-Gulf of Maine transboundary
issues would represent a natural evolution of the Commission's
functions.
CONCLUSION
Neither international law nor the decision of the Special Chamber
of the ICJ in delimiting the Georges Bank-Gulf of Maine boundary
provide more than a starting point for dealing with the shared re-
source and transboundary problems of that area. A survey of the
legal regimes for environmental assessment and marine resource
management reveals commonly shared goals in environmental pro-
tection and conservation, but also discloses significant differences in
policy, law, authority, and administration. When politics, national-
ism, and economics are factored into the formula, there seems to be
little common ground on Georges Bank.
Environmental issues such as acid precipitation, fisheries, and oil
development have been straining Untied States-Canadian relations
for several years and are seen by some commentators as a threat to
the close relationship between the two nations. New institutions,
such as a joint East Coast Fisheries Commission, have not been able
to survive the political pressures created by the United States treaty
ratification process. In the midst of this depressing scene, the Inter-
national Joint Commission has been operating successfully for over
seventy years. It has been under utilized, under funded, and perhaps
its success has been due to the fact that yesterday's problems were
not as difficult or far reaching as today's. Nevertheless, use of the
Commission to deal with some of the problems of Georges Bank
would abrogate the need to establish new institutions and, arguably,
would not even require expanded authority for the Commission.
The economic and environmental goals of the two coun-
tries-achieving optimal resource use, while protecting existing re-
sources for this and future generations-are very similar. If the in-
vestigative authority of the Commission were used to reach a first
level of cooperation and joint agreement on factual issues, those facts
could then become the basis for domestic resource management and
environmental assessment decisions. This significant step toward
reaching common goals could be augmented by a degree of harmoni-
zation in environmental assessment laws, including requiring the
consideration of transnational environmental impacts, some uniform-
ity as to the types of activities requiring environmental assessment,
ity can only be triggered by the request of both parties. In addition, referral is dependent
upon the advice and consent of the Senate. This requirement of independent approval by
the Senate virtually precludes the use oC Article 10. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra
note 390, art. 10.
[VOL. 23: 491, 1986] Georges Bank
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and, perhaps even further use of the International Joint Commission
for joint environmental assessment of projects affecting shared
resources.

